Inside debt compensation held by top officers of U.S. banks is negatively related to risk and risk taking. The evidence reveals a robust and strongly negative relation between end-of-2006 inside debt and 2007–2009 bank-specific risk exposures in terms of lost stock market value, volatility, tail risk, and the probability of financial distress. Banks with managers having large inside debt holdings are also characterized by better-quality assets, more conservative balance sheet management, and a stronger tendency toward traditional banking activities. The results suggest that debt-based compensation limits bank risk and risk taking by encouraging more conservative decision making.

This paper examines the costs and benefits of the EU/IMF rescue package for Ireland, on November 29, 2010. We analyze the costs of the intervention and the subsequent increase in value of debt and/or equity issued by Irish banks, the Irish government, and European banks with substantial holdings of Irish debt. The total initial value increase around the announcement amounts to €5.59bln at a realized taxpayers’ cost of €4.23bln. While the value increase depends on somewhat generous assumptions, it further increases by €2.8bln up to Ireland’s exit in December 2013. About €3.1bln of the value created indirectly supports the European banking sector, indicating that substantial benefits arise from systemic risk containment.

We examine a change in the European Central Bank’s collateral framework, which significantly lowered the rating requirement for eligible residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), and its impact on bank lending and risk-taking in the Netherlands. Banks most affected by the policy increase loan supply and lower interest rates on new mortgage originations. These lower-interest-rate loans serve as collateral for newly issued RMBS with lower-rated tranches and subsequently experience worse repayment performance. The performance deterioration is pronounced among loans with state guarantees, which suggests that looser collateral requirements may lead to undesired credit risk transfer to the sovereign.

We examine a change in the European Central Bank’s collateral framework, which significantly lowered the rating requirement for eligible residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), and its impact on bank lending and risk-taking in the Netherlands. Banks most affected by the policy increase loan supply and lower interest rates on new mortgage originations. These lower-interest-rate loans serve as collateral for newly issued RMBS with lower-rated tranches and subsequently experience worse repayment performance. The performance deterioration is pronounced among loans with state guarantees, which suggests that looser collateral requirements may lead to undesired credit risk transfer to the sovereign. Received June 14, 2016; editorial decision September 8, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

Stocks with high uncertainty about risk, as measured by the volatility of expected volatility (vol-of-vol), robustly underperform stocks with low uncertainty about risk by 8% per year. This vol-of-vol effect is distinct from (combinations of) at least 20 previously documented return predictors, survives many robustness checks, and holds in the United States and across European stock markets. We empirically explore the pricing mechanism behind the vol-of-vol effect. The evidence points toward preference-based explanations and away from alternative explanations. Collectively, our results show that uncertainty about risk is highly relevant for stock prices.

We investigate the relation between sovereign and corporate bond issuance. Sovereign bond issues that increase a country’s maximum maturity are followed by increases in the maximum maturity of corporate issues. Our results point to issuance complementarities based on the benchmarking of corporate bonds to sovereign bonds. Sovereign and corporate bond issues are also substitutes, but substitutability requires the availability of a high-quality sovereign bond benchmark. By adding to existing theories focusing on substitutability, our findings highlight the role that the maturity of sovereign debt plays in capital market development.