This paper reviews recent research on the causes and consequence of different forms of financial market misconduct and potential agency conflicts and the impact of regulating financial market misconduct. We examine regulatory responses to financial market misconduct and highlight the presence of complementarities in financial market misconduct regulation and enforcement. We feature papers that make use of natural experiments, rule changes, and market design changes. Further, the interdisciplinary nature of financial market misconduct research is highlighted, and potential avenues for future research are discussed.

Delaware hedge funds exhibit significant differences in contractual structure in terms of higher management and incentive fees. Delaware funds are more likely to use high watermark provisions and less likely to invest their personal capital. Both the redemption notice periods and lock up periods are significantly longer for Delaware hedge funds. While Delaware hedge funds do not outperform or underperform funds registered elsewhere, fund flows are more sensitive to Delaware funds' prior performance and Delaware funds are more likely to be liquidated due to poor performance. Further, Delaware funds are more likely to increase risk after poor absolute performance.