This paper examines change in property-liability insurers' risk-taking around enactments of state guaranty fund laws. Our evidence suggests that the risk of insurers' asset portfolios increases following enactments. But this increase in risk is significant only for stock insurers. Our evidence of increased risk-taking following guaranty-fund adoptions suggests that the way these funds are organized creates counterproductive investment incentives, especially for stock companies. Because these laws were enacted by states over the period 1969–1981, our evidence on changes in risk-taking helps resolve statistical problems that have been troublesome for studies of bank deposit insurance.

The enactment of property–casualty insurance guaranty fund statutes in the US was associated with a decrease in insurers' reserves for Homeowners and Commercial Multi-Peril insurance. The evidence is: loss ratios among states enacting guaranty fund statutes declined relative to other states. Tests on loss accruals confirm that the effect was due to decrease in reserves. Other tests that distinguish between guaranty fund statutes offer no evidence that guaranty funds encouraged sound insurers to monitor competitors and assist regulators in identifying weak insurers. Instead, the data are consistent with an explanation where insurance regulators identify and discourage risk-increasing activity.