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The Contrarian Bias of Incentivizing Learning

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 2026
Delegating high-stakes decisions creates a fundamental tension: incentivizing experts to acquire unobservable information inevitably distorts their final choices. In a principal-agent setting, we characterize the optimal compensation contract under hidden learning, showing it endogenously generates either contrarian or conformist bias. The direction of this bias depends on learning costs and the precision of public and private information. Our framework links information acquisition incentives to systematic biases in experts’ choices and offers a unifying explanation for conflicting empirical evidence in financial advice: why analysts issue excessive contrarian recommendations, and why inexperienced analysts follow the consensus more than their experienced peers.

How Financial Markets Create Superstars

Review of Financial Studies 2026 open access
By aggregating information into stock prices, financial markets help guide the allocation of resources. We show that speculators without information about firms’ fundamentals can exploit this role of prices and profit from inflating firm valuations. Uninformed speculation is profitable because high valuations attract employees, business partners, and investors, creating value at targeted firms at the cost of diverting resources from better firms. Both large and small speculators, without pre-existing stock positions, can profit from uninformed speculation, particularly when targeting firms with moderate Q, operating in “normal” (neither hot nor cold) markets, and using performance pay or equity to attract stakeholders.