This paper provides a model in which audited reports are valuable to entrepreneurs who have private information and seek to share risks with investors. A distinctive feature of the model is that the choice of auditor and the resulting audited report provide partial information about the entrepreneur's private information, and he resolves all remaining investor uncertainty by signalling with retained ownership. The value of an audit is increasing in audit quality and the firm-specific risk faced by the entrepreneur and is a nondecreasing function of the entrepreneur's expectations about the future value of the firm.

[We present empirical evidence that prior accounting information, such as capital expenditure, retained earnings, funds from operations, and dividend history, is useful in explaining cross-sectional variations in the market response to stock dividend announcements. An important accounting issue concerns the information content of disclosures and their usefulness to the investor. We demonstrate the complementary role of previously disclosed firm-specific accounting information in the market's assessment of subsequently disclosed information. Thus, two firms declaring the same amount of stock dividend may experience predictably different market reactions to the announcement when it is conditioned by prior information about the firms. Comparable research by Kane et al. (1984) has shown that changes in earnings and dividends either corroborate or contradict prior information. A broader approach by Gonedes (1978) and Antle et al. (1991) shows that the sequence and history of information arrival are relevant in interpreting the information content of accounting signals. Ou and Penman (1989) demonstrate the role of prior accounting information in predicting earnings changes in subsequent periods, and John and Lang (1991) have shown, both theoretically and empirically, that the market uses information about prior insider trading to interpret the information content of dividend changes. Stock dividends are appropriate for an investigation of the complementary role of prior accounting information because their issuance is largely a paper transaction, and because they have been interpreted as a signal of better future prospects. Although significant positive abnormal returns usually accompany stock dividend announcements, alternative (and more credible) instruments could signal future prospects (such as an increase in cash dividends). The uncertainty about how investors interpret stock dividend distributions suggests a role for previously disclosed accounting information as a conditioning factor. A survey of managers of firms declaring stock dividends (Eisemann and Moses 1978) indicates that such distributions are intended either to conserve cash in difficult times or to express confidence in the firm, two diametrically opposed motivations. So one firm may declare stock rather than cash dividends in order to invest in more profitable ventures, and another may do so because it faces operating losses and a severe cash crunch. Absent other information, it is likely that the market will respond negatively when cash dividends are discontinued or decreased and replaced by stock dividends (Shefrin and Statman 1984). Other firm-specific accounting information, however, such as capital expenditure (which reflects new investments) and funds from operations (which reflect cash availability), may also influence investor responses when considered in conjunction with dividend history.]

Incentive systems, Sequential production, Capacity constraints, Manufacturing

Performance evaluation, Linear aggregation, Compensation contracts

This paper analyzes a formal principal‐agents model of resource allocation and coordination in which demand for transfer pricing arises endogenously within a decentralized environment characterized by asymmetric information and divergence of preferences. It is shown that a modified Groves scheme achieves full information efficiency in a setting of the type considered by Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) and Cohen and Loeb (1984) only if the information asymmetry is postcontract and collusion is precluded. Conditions for the optimality of a coordination mechanism that is immune to collusion are also examined. It is shown that demand for a collusion‐free marginal cost‐type transfer pricing scheme arises if the agents are risk neutral, the cost function is separable but not necessarily linear, and the information asymmetry is postcontract. Résumé. Les auteurs analysent un modèle structuré d'affectation des ressources et de coordination mandant‐mandataire, dans lequel la demande de prix de cession interne est issue, de façon endogène, d'un contexte décentralisé caractérisé par une information asymétrique et une divergence des préférences. Les auteurs démontrent qu'un schéma Groves modifié permet d'atteindre l'efficacité maximum de l'information dans un contexte semblable à celui qu'utilisent Harris, Kriebel et Raviv (1982) et Cohen et Loeb (1984), uniquement si l'asymétrie de l'information est postérieure au contrat et si la collusion est rendue impossible. Ils examinent également les conditions d'optimalité d'un mécanisme de coordination qui est à l'abri de la collusion. Les auteurs démontrent qu'il y a demande de prix de cession interne, à l'abri de la collusion, du type coût marginal si les mandataires sont neutres à l'egard du risque, si la fonction de coûts peut être isolée sans être nécessairement linéaire, et si l'asymétrie de l'information est postérieure au contrat.

[Managers frequently choose the amounts to expend in various activities simultaneously rather than sequentially. Quality costs provide a common example. When managing quality, decisions to invest in different types of prevention activities are made jointly. For example, spending more on maintenance simultaneously reduced the spending necessary on supervision. Similarly, scrap costs are often traded off against the costs of prevention and appraisal activities. Our article is motivated by field observations at an automobile lamp manufacturing plant. Specifically, we estimate two observed effects: (1) the influence of lamp design on the consumption of overhead resources during manufacturing (e.g., the effect of multicolor designs on supervision costs) and (2) the interdependence among supervision, maintenance, and scrap costs. One way to understand cost drivers and manage costs is to employ an activity-based costing approach (Cooper and Kaplan 1991, chap. 5; Young and Selto 1991). With this approach, prevention costs of supervision and maintenance are allocated to products on the basis of hours of supervision and maintenance, and scarp costs are apportioned on the basis of physical scrap levels. Quality-related costs are reevaluated after products are redesigned and processes reconfigured to determine if quality related costs have indeed decreased. With such an approach, simultaneous effects of costs are not estimated. In our approach, we simultaneously estimate interdependencies among activities. Instead of supervision hours, maintenance hours, and physical scrap levels, we use product and process design variables as cost drivers of supervision, maintenance, and scrap costs. Selecting product and process variables as cost drivers allows us to estimate the effect of alternative lamp designs on quality costs incurred during manufacturing. We also explicitly consider simultaneity. For example, our estimation procedure recognizes that maintenance costs affect supervision costs and vice versa and that both costs are affected by product and process design choices. Our analysis provides valuable information to managers. At our site, designers use quality costs associated with different design features to guide future product designs and modifications. Similarly, as operations managers experiment with different methods to manage complexity, the simultaneous cost estimation enables them to evaluate which prevention activities are successful in reducing scrap.]

[Management accountants are often required to construct measures of performance of individual managers by aggregating several accounting numbers (signals). We show that the same method of aggregation will rarely be used for evaluating the performance of different managers. Instead, the method of aggregation will vary with the specific preference functions of individual managers and the corresponding action choices induced by the owner. Such an optimal aggregate always exists but is not, in general, a sufficient statistic for the individual signals with respect to the agent's effort. We further show that, in most cases, using all the information in the sufficient statistic makes the principal strictly worse off. The analysis provides insights into a different statistical approach for evaluating nonsufficient aggregates based on the signal to noise ratio of the individual signals that are aggregated.]

Conventional management accounting principles used to evaluate relevant costs have been developed under the assumption of deterministic manufacturing settings. Manufacturing operations, however, are complex and stochastic. In this paper we examine the impact of stochasticity in the production process on relevant costs based on a dynamic assessment of capacity constraints. We develop a model to analyze the behavior of relevant costs with respect to changes in the expected duration and variability in set-ups and processing. An implication of this analysis is that for profit maximization capacity will exceed expected demand if production rates or demand are stochastic.

Management control, Moral Hazard, Just-in-Time management, Motivation

This paper employs a generalized principal‐agent model to analyze accounting situations in which the outcome is not jointly observable and the principal's and agent's preferences are multiattribute in nature. This requires the consideration of accounting signals for risk‐sharing (or insurance) information in addition to performance evaluation (or incentive) information. It is shown that precisely two factors determine whether a signal will be valuable in the agency relationship: Observability of the agent's effort and the principal's multivariate risk neutrality. Sufficient conditions for various accounting signals to have value are also developed. Furthermore, when multiple accounting signals are available, it is shown that under certain conditions, the insurance components of the multiple signals can be aggregated into a single aggregate insurance measure and the incentive components of the signals can be aggregated (via a different aggregation procedure) into another aggregate incentive measure. Résumé. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle généralisé mandant‐mandataire pour analyser les situations comptables dans lesquelles le résultat n'est pas observable conjointement et les préférences du mandant et du mandataire comportent, par nature, de multiples attributs. Cela exige la prise en considération d'indicateurs comptables relatifs à l'information sur le partage des risques (ou de l'assurance) en plus de l'information relative à l'évaluation du rendement (ou aux stimulants). Les auteurs démontrent que deux facteurs permettent de déterminer avec précision si un indicateur sera valable dans la relation de mandataire: le caractère observable de l'effort du mandataire et la neutralité multivariée du mandant à l'égard du risque. Des conditions suffisantes pour que les divers indicateurs comptables soient valables sont également établies. En outre, lorsque des indicateurs comptables multiples sont disponibles, les auteurs démontrent que dans certaines conditions, les éléments des indicateurs multiples liés à l'assurance peuvent faire l'objet d'une regroupement en une seule mesure globale d'assurance, et que les éléments des indicateurs liés aux stimulants peuvent faire l'objet d'une regroupement (au moyen d'une méthode différente) en une autre mesure globale des stimulants.