Financial institutions manage myriad sources of interest rate risk. We propose a new method to measure financial institutions’ residual interest rate risk using high-frequency financial market data. We provide theoretical justification for the method using a model of life insurance companies with endogenous interest rate risk management. Applying the method to U.S. insurers, we find that their interest rate risk management strategies are generally effective. Analyzing a panel of insurers confirms a key theoretical prediction: The effectiveness of interest rate risk management depends, in part, on the ability to create net worth.

The interaction of worsening fundamentals and strategic complementarities among investors renders identification of self-fulfilling runs challenging. We propose a dynamic model to show how exogenous variation in firms’ liability structures can be exploited to obtain variation in the strength of strategic complementarities. Applying this identification strategy to puttable securities offered by US life insurers, we find that at least 40% of the $18 billion run on life insurers by institutional investors during the 2007–8 crisis was amplified by self-fulfilling expectations. Our findings suggest that other contemporaneous runs in shadow banking by institutional investors may have had a self-fulfilling component.

H ow did the collapse of the asset‐backed securities (ABS) market during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis affect the supply of credit to the broader economy? Using new data on the U.S. credit union industry, we find that ABS‐related losses are associated with a large contraction in the supply of credit to consumers, especially among those credit unions that began the crisis with weaker capitalization. We also find that this credit supply shock restricted the availability of mortgage and automobile credit. These results show how movements in the prices of financial assets can affect the real economy.