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Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobserved Heterogeneity

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2009 91(1), 227-227
February 01 2009 Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobserved Heterogeneity Stacey H Chen Stacey H Chen Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Stacey H Chen Online ISSN: 1530-9142 Print ISSN: 0034-6535 Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2009 The Review of Economics and Statistics (2009) 91 (1): 227. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.1.227 Connected Content This is a correction to: Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobserved Heterogeneity Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Search Site Citation Stacey H Chen; Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobserved Heterogeneity. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2009; 91 (1): 227. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.1.227 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsThe Review of Economics and Statistics Search Advanced Search View Original Article Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2009 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Estimating the Variance of Wages in the Presence of Selection and Unobserved Heterogeneity

The Review of Economics and Statistics 2008 90(2), 275-289
Identification of potential wage distributions by education is important to the study of the causal links between education, inequality, and uncertainty. Potential wage inequality within an educational group (that is, the variance in wages if all workers had the same education) exceeds the observed statistics because self-selected education truncates wage distributions. Decomposing potential wage inequality into heterogeneity (known to the agent making the educational choice) and uncertainty (unknown to the agent) suggests that wage uncertainty does not necessarily rise with education. It is unobserved heterogeneity, not uncertainty, that explains the observed relationship between college graduation and higher wage inequality.

Long-term Consequences of Vietnam-Era Conscription: New Estimates Using Social Security Data

American Economic Review 2011 101(3), 334-338 open access
We use the draft lottery to construct instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the impact of Vietnam-era military service on veterans' Social Security (SSA) earnings through 2007. We also use SSA data to construct IV estimates for employment (as measured by an indicator for positive earnings) and disability status (as measured by an indicator for social security disability program application). New findings for recent years show surprisingly rapid convergence in veteran and nonveteran earnings: by the early 1990s, there was no longer a substantial Vietnam-era conscription penalty. The IV estimates also show no effect on employment or disability rates.

Physicians Treating Physicians: Relational and Informational Advantages in Treatment and Survival

Journal of Labor Economics 2025 43(1), 15-46 open access
We use the medical specialties of physician-patients with advanced cancer to study the role of knowledge versus networks in treatment choices and patient survival by matching comparable patients with doctors and admission periods to control unobserved doctor quality. Physician-patients are less likely to have surgery, radiation, or checkups and more likely to receive targeted therapy, spend more on drugs, enjoy a higher survival rate, and spend less on coinsurance than nonphysician-patients. Knowledge mechanisms play a crucial role because the network effect explains some, but not all, patterns. For less informed physician-patients, possessing a network is equivalent to reducing medical knowledge.