The paper analyzes the use of reported accounting earnings and price as a basis for compensating a manager when he trades on private information, and share price is set rationally based on privately held information, publicly available and contractible information, and publicly available but noncontractible information. In addition, we analyze the comparative statics of the compensation on reported earnings and price with respect to changes in the economy.

[This paper explores a possible explanation for the observed use of bonus pool arrangements. Under fairly general conditions, the use of a bonus pool arrangement results in a strict Pareto improvement by enabling an owner to exploit non-contractible information, that might otherwise not be used, to motivate agents. We characterize the optimal bonus pool arrangement and analyze the interdependencies which it induces between agents. Our results demonstrate the manner in which the use of non-contractible information via bonus pool schemes distorts the payoffs to agents relative to the case in which the non-contractible information is not used.]

Capital investment decisions, Centralized organization, Delegation, Shared responsibility

Explores a possible explanation for the observed use of bonus pool arrangements. Model illustrating optimal bonus arrangement; Use of non-contractible information.

Decentralized firms, Task allocation, Principle-agent model, Expertise