We examine the effects of the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, or MERS, on mortgage origination volumes and foreclosure rates prior to the Great Recession. MERS was introduced in the late 1990s and significantly reduced the cost and time associated with secondary mortgage sales. Using novel data from the Massachusetts Registry of Deeds, we show that the introduction of MERS led to an expansion in mortgage credit supply that was primarily fueled by nonbank lenders originating mortgages to low-income borrowers. We also find that foreclosure rates were higher on these mortgages. Our paper provides a new explanation for the credit supply increases observed prior to the 2008 financial crisis and for the disproportionate supply increase observed in low-income areas.

We study the determinants of value creation in U.S. commercial banks. We develop novel measures of individual banks’ productivities at collecting deposits and making loans that we relate to bank market values. We find that deposit productivity is responsible for two-thirds of the value of the median bank and most variation in value across banks. Variation in productivity is driven by differences across banks in technology, customer demographics, and market power. We also find evidence of synergies between deposit-taking and lending. Our findings suggest that there is significant heterogeneity in banks’ ability to capture value by manufacturing safe assets.

Powerful politicians can interfere with the enforcement of regulations. As such, expected political interference can affect constituents’ behavior. Using rotations of Senate committee chairs to identify variation in political power and expected regulatory relief, we study powerful politicians’ effect on consumer lending to communities protected by fair-lending regulations. We find a 7.5% reduction in credit access to minority neighborhoods in states with new committee chairs. Larger reductions occur in Community Reinvestment Act-eligible neighborhoods and when Senators serve on committees that oversee the enforcement of fair-lending laws. Banks headquartered in powerful Senators’ states are responsible for the reduction in credit access.

We exploit unexpected corporate data breaches to study the loss and repair of corporate reputation. Reputation loss decreases equity and brand values, increases customer churn, and prompts more negative media coverage. Firms repair their reputation by increasing their charitable donations and have CSR scores that are more than 0.5 standard deviations higher. They increase political contributions, employee wages, and IT investment. These actions are targeted to stakeholders that are particularly important or in situations that are particularly salient to their stakeholders. We observe similar dynamics of reputation loss and repair following the release of negative news about firms’ social behaviors.

We examine whether politicians affect local firms’ industrial pollution, and whether such effects are transmitted through plant-level networks to affect pollution in other regions. We first document that close Democrat wins in U.S. congressional races are associated with lower emissions and higher abatement at the plant level, especially when politicians have strong pro-environmental preferences. We also find evidence of reallocation: firms shift emissions away from areas represented by Democrats. However, reallocation is imperfect: firm-level costs are higher and market-to-book ratios lower if firms’ representation is more Democratic. Lower pollution-related illnesses around plants in Democratic districts suggest pass-through effects on local communities.

We document that the percentage of all U.S. assets that are “safe” has remained stable at about 33 percent since 1952. This stable ratio is a rare example of calm in a rapidly changing financial world. Over the same time period, the ratio of U.S. assets to GDP has increased by a factor of 2.5, and the main supplier of safe financial debt has shifted from commercial banks to the “shadow banking system.” We analyze this pattern of stylized facts and offer some tentative conclusions about the composition of the safe-asset share and its role within the overall economy.