This paper reviews the literature on commercial sport through the lens of the economic theory of contests/tournaments. It seeks to draw together research on incentives in individualistic sports such as golf and footraces with the research on uncertainty of outcome and competitive balance in team sports such as baseball and soccer. The contest framework is used to analyze issues such as the optimal distribution of prizes, the impact of revenue sharing, salary caps, draft rules, and a variety of other restraints commonly employed in sports leagues. The paper draws heavily on a comparative analysis of contest organization, in particular between North America and Europe.

This paper proposes a market test for racial discrimination in salary setting in English league soccer over the period 1978–93 using a balanced panel of 39 clubs. If there is a competitive market for the services of players, the wage bill of the club will reflect their productivity and hence the performance of the club in the league. Discrimination can be said to exist if clubs fielding an above‐average proportion of black players systematically outperform clubs with a below‐average proportion of black players, after one controls for the wage bill. Statistically significant evidence of discrimination in this sense is found.