This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank’s expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks’ fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers’ coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.

We study four fundamental components of financial agency settings: The perception of commonly used investment profile terminology, agents’ customization of portfolios to clients’ preferences, the effect of agents’ and clients’ preferences on investment levels, and the role of compensation schemes. We observe large heterogeneity in the perception of investment profiles, resulting in substantial miscommunication between clients and agents. Financial agents show a high willingness to implement their clients’ preferred investment profiles, yet appear to fail because of deviating perceptions. Agents’ own investment preferences matter, but take a back seat to clients’ preferences in determining investment shares. Different monetary incentive schemes hardly affect behavior. Our results suggest that moral constraints can limit agents’ discretion in the agency situation.

We study the impact of disclosure about bank fundamentals on depositors’ behavior in the presence (and absence) of economic linkages between financial institutions. Using a controlled laboratory environment, we identify under which conditions disclosure is conducive to bank stability. We find that bank deposits are sensitive to perceived bank performance. While banks with strong fundamentals benefit from more precise disclosure, an opposite effect is present for solvent banks with weaker fundamentals. Depositors take information about economic linkages into account and correctly identify when disclosure about one institution conveys meaningful information for others. Our findings suggest potential costs of bank transparency and that disclosure may not always be stability-enhancing.

We study the prevalence of the higher order risk attitudes of prudence and temperance in an experiment with a large demographically representative sample of participants. Under expected utility, prudence and temperance are defined by a convex first, and concave second, derivative of the utility function, and have direct implications for saving behaviour and portfolio choice. In the experiment, participants make pairwise choices that distinguish prudent from imprudent, and temperate from intemperate, behaviour. We correlate individuals' risk aversion, prudence, and temperance levels to their demographic profiles and their financial decisions outside the experiment. We observe that the majority of individuals' decisions are consistent with risk aversion, prudence, and temperance. Prudence is positively correlated with saving, as predicted by precautionary saving theory. Temperance is negatively correlated with the riskiness of portfolio choices.

We study risk attitudes, ambiguity attitudes, and time preferences of 661 children and adolescents, aged ten to eighteen years, in an incentivized experiment and relate experimental choices to field behavior. Experimental measures of impatience are found to be significant predictors of health-related field behavior, saving decisions, and conduct at school. In particular, more impatient children and adolescents are more likely to spend money on alcohol and cigarettes, have a higher body mass index, are less likely to save money, and show worse conduct at school. Experimental measures for risk and ambiguity attitudes are only weak predictors of field behavior.