A choice function is strictly rational whenever it can be rationalized by a preference relation in a manner such that alternatives in a choice set are strictly preferred to alternatives in the corresponding rejection set. We demonstrate an Extension Theorem which asserts that a preference relation strictly rationalizes the choice function if and only if the choice function satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the preference relation is an extension of the revealed weak preference relation. Then we consider various applications to rational choice theory.

Journal Article A Combinatorial Analysis of the Overlapping Generations Model Get access Stephen A. Clark Stephen A. Clark University of Kentucky Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 1, January 1981, Pages 139–145, https://doi.org/10.2307/2297126 Published: 01 January 1981 Article history Received: 01 July 1979 Accepted: 01 May 1980 Published: 01 January 1981

On caracterise les axiomes faible et fort de preference revelee en termes de m-rationalite. Cette caracterisation eclaire le lien fondamental avec les axiomes de comportement de Richter pour la g-rationalite. L'approche presentee ici, est motivee par un operateur de complementarite, defini sur des preferences, qui montre le rapport logique entre ces deux concepts de choix rationnel