A model with private information that supports conventional arguments for a government monopoly in supplying circulating media of exchange is constructed. The model also yields rate-of-return and velocity predictions which are consistent with observations from free banking regimes and fiat money regimes. In a laissezfaire banking equilibrium, fiat money is (essentially) not valued, and the resulting allocation is not Pareto optimal. However, if private agents are restricted from issuing circulating notes, there exists an equilibrium with valued fiat money that Pareto dominates the laissez-faire equilibrium and is Pareto optimal within a restricted class of allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 020, 310.

This review essay reviews the volume edited by Owen Humpage, Current Federal Reserve Policy under the Lens of Economic History: Essays to Commemorate the Federal Reserve System’s Centennial, and provides a broader perspective on central-banking issues. The papers in the Humpage volume address various aspects of central banking history, money, and private banking, with a focus on putting recent Fed policies in perspective. The topics covered include the role of the central bank as lender of last resort, the effects of open-market operations versus central-bank lending, central-bank independence, the political economy of monetary unions, financial crises, the effects of unconventional monetary policies, commodity monies, and the Canadian financial system as a natural experiment.

A general equilibrium model of imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries is constructed and used to study the effects of some standard policy experiments. One-time increases in the growth rate and in the level of the stock of money have non-neutral (and sometimes surprising) effects on interest rates, the quantity of intermediated borrowing and lending, the number of intermediary firms, inflation and the price level. Optimal government macroeconomic policy is shown to reflect a tradeoff between public sector frictions and the capital market distortion created by increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition in private intermediation.

Journal Article Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing Get access Stephen D. Williamson Stephen D. Williamson Queen's University and University of Western Ontario Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 102, Issue 1, February 1987, Pages 135–145, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884684 Published: 01 February 1987

A model of public and private liquidity integrates financial intermediation theory with a New Monetarist monetary framework. Non-passive fiscal policy and costs of operating a currency system imply that an optimal policy deviates from the Friedman rule. A liquidity trap can exist in equilibrium away from the Friedman rule, and there exists a permanent nonneutrality of money, driven by an illiquidity effect. Financial frictions can produce a financial-crisis phenomenon that can be mitigated by conventional open market operations working in an unconventional manner. Private asset purchases by the central bank are either irrelevant or they reallocate credit and redistribute income.

In this paper, a general-equilibrium business- cycle model is construct ed that, when subjected to real disturbances, mimics observed qualita tive comovements among real output, money, business failures, risk pr emia, intermediary loans, and prices. In contrast, monetary disturban ces generate cycles that have several inconsistencies with empirical evidence, thus providing support for real business-cycle theory at th e expense of monetary theories of the business cycle. Financial inter mediation arises endogenously in the model and intermediation matters for business-cycle behavior. A credit supply mechanism acts in tande m with an intertemporal substitution effect in propagating stochastic disturbances.