We investigate the long-run return performance of non-U.S. firms that raise equity capital in U.S. markets. Overall, between 1982 and 1996, our sample of 333 global equity offerings with U.S. depositary receipt (ADR) tranches from 35 countries in Asia, Latin America, and Europe under-perform local market benchmarks of comparable firms by 8%–15% over the three years following issuance. We show that differences in long-run returns are related to the scope and magnitude of investment barriers that induce segmentation of capital markets around the world. While companies from markets with significant investment barriers for foreigners that issue equity on major U.S. exchanges outperform their benchmarks, those from segmented markets that issue equity in the U.S. by way of Rule 144A private placements significantly under-perform. We also show that inter-market competition for order flow in the post-issuance period affects long-run return performance. Post-issuance buy-and-hold abnormal returns are most significantly and positively related to the offering's ability to generate a larger share of U.S. trading volume.

We investigate issuers withdrawing an IPO (after security regulation filings) that return later for a successful offering. Venture capital backing and reputation of the lead underwriter are key factors in predicting successful return. The possibility of returning has a significant impact on the decision to withdraw and the pricing of offerings that succeed. Our sample of returning IPOs also provides a unique setting to investigate underwriter switching after a withdrawal but before a successful IPO. We find that switching occurs in response to poor bank performance and when switching firms “graduate” to banks that have high industry market shares.

Non‐U.S. firms cross‐listing shares on U.S. exchanges as American Depositary Receipts earn cumulative abnormal returns of 19 percent during the year before listing, and an additional 1.20 percent during the listing week, but incur a loss of 14 percent during the year following listing. We show how these unusual share price changes are robust to changing market risk exposures and are related to an expansion of the shareholder base and to the amount of capital raised at the time of listing. Our tests provide support for the market segmentation hypothesis and Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis.

Non‐U.S. firms cross‐listing shares on U.S. exchanges as American Depositary Receipts earn cumulative abnormal returns of 19 percent during the year before listing, and an additional 1.20 percent during the listing week, but incur a loss of 14 percent during the year following listing. We show how these unusual share price changes are robust to changing market risk exposures and are related to an expansion of the shareholder base and to the amount of capital raised at the time of listing. Our tests provide support for the market segmentation hypothesis and Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis.

We develop evidence on the finite sample properties of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in an asset pricing context. The models imply nonlinear, cross-equation restrictions on predictive regressions for security returns. We find that a two-stage GMM approach produces goodness-of-fit statistics that reject the restrictions too often. An iterated GMM approach has superior finite sample properties. The coefficient estimates are approximately unbiased in simpler models, but their asymptotic standard errors are understated. Simple adjustments for the standard errors are partially successful in correcting the bias. In more complex models the coefficients and their standard errors can be highly unreliable. The power of the tests to reject a single-premium model is higher against a two-premium, fixed-beta alternative than against a conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model with time-varying betas.

The methods of Michael R. Gibbons and Wayne Ferson (1985) are extended, relaxing the assumption that expected returns are linear functions of predetermined instruments. A model of conditional mean-variance spanning generalizes G. Huberman and S. Kandel (1987). The empirical results indicate that more than a single risk premium is needed to model expected stock and bond returns, but the number of common factors in the expected returns is small. However, when size-based common stock portfolios proxy for the risk factors, the authors reject the hypothesis that four of them describe the conditional expected returns of the other assets.

We examine 1984–2018 data and show that the talent or ability of sell-side financial analysts affects a covered firm's information environment—more so than the simple number of analysts covering a firm. We find that while analysts in general produce market and industry-level information, high-ability analysts contribute more firm-specific information. Firms covered by high-ability analysts experience significantly less insider trading prior to positive earnings news. Results only reside in opportunistic (not routine) trades. When an analyst initiates (terminates) coverage we find decreased (increased) subsequent insider trading. Both changes are primarily driven by analyst talent. Analyst ability also negatively relates to insider trading profitability.

The methods of Gibbons and Ferson (1985) are extended, relaxing the assumption that expected returns are linear functions of predetermined instruments. A model of conditional mean-variance spanning generalizes Huberman and Kandel (1987). The empirical results indicate that more than a single risk premium is needed to model expected stock and bond returns, but the number of common factors in the expected returns is small. However, when size-based common stock portfolios proxy for the risk factors, we reject the hypothesis that four of them describe the conditional expected returns of the other assets.

ABSTRACT The methods of Gibbons and Ferson (1985) are extended, relaxing the assumption that expected returns are linear functions of predetermined instruments. A model of conditional mean‐variance spanning generalizes Huberman and Kandel (1987). The empirical results indicate that more than a single risk premium is needed to model expected stock and bond returns, but the number of common factors in the expected returns is small. However, when size‐based common stock portfolios proxy for the risk factors, we reject the hypothesis that four of them describe the conditional expected returns of the other assets.

ABSTRACT Using unique data on Canadian households, we show that financial advisors exert substantial influence over their clients' asset allocation, but provide limited customization. Advisor fixed effects explain considerably more variation in portfolio risk and home bias than a broad set of investor attributes that includes risk tolerance, age, investment horizon, and financial sophistication. Advisor effects remain important even when controlling flexibly for unobserved heterogeneity through investor fixed effects. An advisor's own asset allocation strongly predicts the allocations chosen on clients' behalf. This one‐size‐fits‐all advice does not come cheap: advised portfolios cost 2.5% per year, or 1.5% more than life cycle funds.