We study the relationship between welfare benefits and the time to first marriage and time to next birth among initially unwed mothers. We use twin births to generate random within‐state variation in benefits, effectively controlling for unobservables that may confound the relationship between welfare payments and behavior. Higher base welfare benefits (1) lead unwed white mothers to forestall their eventual marriage and (2) lead unwed black mothers to hasten their next birth. The magnitudes of these effects are fairly modest. Moreover, we find no evidence that the marginal benefit paid at the birth of an additional child—the focus of the family cap debate—affects fertility.

We present empirical evidence on the relationship between individual wages, conditional on worker characteristics, and equity returns using a unique survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Equity returns affect the wages only of workers with three or more years of tenure. A 4 percent increase in a firm's market value raises pay by 0.3 percent within three years. Our estimates suggest that each $10 increase in shareholder wealth raises the present value of a firm's wage bill by $1. The elasticity of white‐collar wages with respect to equity returns is one‐third smaller than the CEO salary elasticities in our sample.