Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, U.S. Treasury bonds and notes appeared to have negative nominal yields as they approached maturity. But negative nominal interest rates are impossible in a world in which one can always hold cash. The resolution to this puzzle is that Treasury securities, in addition to making coupon payments, gave the owner the right to buy a new security on a future date. This paper describes the institutional environment that led to the apparent negative nominal interest rates; develops a method for valuing the "exchange privilege"; and computes accurate measures of the yield to the coupon-bearing component of these composite bond/options.

Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, U.S. Treasury bonds and notes appeared to have negative nominal yields as they approached maturity. But negative nominal interest rates are impossible in a world in which one can always hold cash. The resolution to this puzzle is that Treasury securities, in addition to making coupon payments, gave the owner the right to buy a new security on a future date. This paper describes the institutional environment that led to the apparent negative nominal interest rates, develops a method for valuing the "exchange privilege," and computes accurate measures of the yield to the coupon-bearing component of these composite bond/options. These corrected bond and not yields are then used to calculate new estimates of the term structure of interest rates from 1929 to 1949.

Many Keynesian macroeconomic models are based on the assumption that firms change prices at different times. This paper presents an explanation for this "staggered" price setting. We develop a model in which firms have imperfect knowledge of the current state of the economy and gain information by observing the prices set by others. This gives each firm an incentive to set its price shortly after other firms set theirs. Staggering can be the equilibrium outcome. In addition, the information gains can make staggering socially optimal even though it increases aggregate fluctuations.

Standard approaches to designing a futures hedge often suffer from two major problems. First, they focus only on minimizing risk, so no account is taken of the impact on expected return. Second , in estima ting the hedge ratio, no allowance is made for time variation in the distribution of cash and futures price changes. This paper describes a technique for estimating the optimal futures hedge that corrects these problems and illustrates its use in hedging Treasury bonds with T-bond futures.