In a recent paper in this Journal, Gaumnitz et al. [1982] provided evidence on the consensus of auditors' judgments which seemed to reconcile conflicting results reported in Ashton [1974] and Joyce [1976]. In their study Gaumnitz et al. [1982] combined judgment tasks of evaluating internal control and recommending the number of audit hours needed to assess the propriety and collectibility of accounts receivable. They reported mean correlations of 0.704 and 0.617 for internal control and audit planning judgments, respectively. The former was consistent with Ashton [1974] and the latter was higher than observed by Joyce [1976], who reported a mean correlation of only .373 for audit hour of an accounts receivable subsystem. Gaumnitz et al. suggested that by linking the two judgment tasks they reinforced the link between internal control and planned number of audit hours. Specifically, they stated: link is provided by the auditor's knowledge that an inverse relationship should exist between the strength of internal control and the number of audit hours planned. Thus, the requirement to provide an explicit judgment on the strength of internal control enabled our subjects to operationalize this inverse relationship, resulting in a high correlation (relative to Joyce's findings) among audit hour estimates [1982, pp. 753]. This explanation appears plausible given the results of previous audit judgment research. That is, high levels of consensus have been found for

[Decisions about a subordinate's behavior are among the most important control problems facing audit managers and partners. Green and Mitchell [1979] apply attribution theory to examine supervisors' decisions made following a subordinate's behavior. Green and Mitchell argue that an individual's causal attributions regarding a subordinate's behavior serve as mediators between the behavior of the subordinate and the action responses of the evaluator. This paper reports the results of a study that examines the attribution judgments and responses made by auditors following an incidence of an audit senior's poor performance. Employee work history and client history each significantly affect the attribution judgments made by auditors. Also, the attribution judgments were associated significantly with the recommended responses of auditors. Additional analyses showed that the association was higher for internal attributions and responses than for external attributions and responses.]

We investigate whether the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) impacts labor investment efficiency. By lowering the top corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, ceteris paribus, the TCJA provides firms with a cash windfall. Based on difference-in-differences analysis using non-US based firms as a control group, we find that in the post-TCJA years, labor investment inefficiency increased for US based, but not for non-US based, firms. Further, the increase in labor investment inefficiency is concentrated among US firms with high cash holdings, suggesting that these firms face higher agency costs in the post-TCJA period. Additional analysis suggests that in the post-TCJA period, managers of high cash holding firms were seeking a quiet life. We find weak evidence that strong corporate governance mitigated this negative behavior. Overall, our findings show that tax reform can impact labor investment efficiency and should be of interest to investors, boards of directors, tax authorities, and to researchers.

Decisions about a subordinate's behavior are among the most important control problems facing audit managers and partners. Green and Mitchell [1979] apply attribution theory to examine supervisors' decisions made following a subordinate's behavior. Green and Mitchell argue that an individual's causal attributions regarding a subordinate's behavior serve as mediators between the behavior of the subordinate and the action responses of the evaluator. This paper reports the results of a study that examines the attribution judgments and responses made by auditors following an incidence of an audit senior's poor performance. Employee work history and client history each significantly affect the attribution judgments made by auditors. Also, the attribution judgments were associated significantly with the recommended responses of auditors. Additional analyses showed that the association was higher for internal attributions and responses than for external attributions and responses.

Audit researchers have a long-standing interest in understanding whether issuing a going concern report to financially stressed clients protects auditors from litigation. An endogeneity issue arises, in that litigation risk affects the going concern decision and the going concern decision impacts auditor litigation risk. Using a simultaneous equations approach, we find a significant positive association between auditors' ex ante litigation risk and going concern reporting. By applying simultaneous equations, we also find a significant negative association between going concern reporting and auditor litigation, suggesting that auditors deter lawsuits by issuing going concern reports to their financially stressed clients. Our research further provides a more rigorous analysis of the relation between going concern reporting and lawsuit outcomes in the form of auditor litigation dismissals, small settlement amounts, and large settlement amounts. Our results indicate that when auditors are named in lawsuits, having issued a going concern report reduces the likelihood of large financial settlements. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available through sources identified in the study.

We investigate whether management's decision regarding the recognition of the valuation allowance (VA) for deferred tax assets provides incremental information about the persistence of accounting losses. We introduce a classification scheme that assigns loss firm‐years into three categories based on whether management appears to have recognized a material change in the VA, and whether or not the firm has positive taxable income (e.g., a net operating loss). The results of our study show that our tax categories contain information about the persistence of accounting losses over the following three years beyond variables previously identified to predict loss persistence. This incremental information is consistent with management using private information about the firm's future prospects in setting the VA. Finally, we find that investors’ pricing of the VA varies with the saliency of the tax signal and the information environment of the firm.