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Reputation Concerns and Slow-Moving Capital

The Review of Asset Pricing Studies 2021 11(3), 580-609
We analyze fund managers’ reputation concerns in an equilibrium model, in which we tie together a number of seemingly unrelated phenomena. The model shows that because of reputation concerns, hedge fund managers, especially those with an average reputation, prefer strategies with negatively skewed return distributions. One subtle consequence of this preference is that capital sometimes appears slow moving, leaving profitable investment opportunities unexploited, yet other times appears fast moving, causing large capital relocation and price fluctuations in the absence of fundamental news. More broadly, the analysis demonstrates a limitation of market discipline: fund managers may distort their investments precisely because of market discipline.

Charitable capital allocation: Evidence from private foundations

Journal of Financial Economics 2026 185, 104377 open access
We examine how private foundations allocate charitable capital in response to recipient need. Using financial shocks to peer foundations (who fund the same recipients), we isolate exogenous changes in the marginal value of grants. Foundations respond to need by reallocating grants across recipients, particularly for scientific causes and longer donor–recipient relationships. However, their annual grantmaking budgets show little intertemporal flexibility, instead prioritizing capital preservation. Among governance characteristics, founder involvement predicts both cross-sectional responsiveness and intertemporal conservatism. Our findings highlight a tension: founders’ charitable intent supports effective allocation, but their inclination toward capital preservation can hinder impact maximization.

Reprint of: Delegated asset management and performance when some investors are unsophisticated

Journal of Banking & Finance 2022 140, 106406
Households with limited financial expertise sometimes attempt to avoid investment mistakes by delegating the management of their investments to experts. However, evidence on the efficacy of delegation has been mixed. This paper contributes to understanding the question: why is the acquired expertise of asset managers a limited substitute for investors’ lack of expertise? We consider an economy with investors (who vary in sophistication) and managers (who vary in skill). Unsophisticated investors’ lack of expertise makes it hard for them to distinguish skilled managers from unskilled ones. In the equilibrium that follows, investors exert little effort when searching for managers, leading to a suboptimal composition of managerial types entering the market. When unsophisticated investors are endowed with weak signals, they attempt to time their entry and exit from the market for managers, but their actions are predictable, so performance continues to suffer.

Delegated asset management and performance when some investors are unsophisticated

Journal of Banking & Finance 2021 133, 106289
Households with limited financial expertise sometimes attempt to avoid investment mistakes by delegating the management of their investments to experts. However, evidence on the efficacy of delegation has been mixed. This paper contributes to understanding the question: why is the acquired expertise of asset managers a limited substitute for investors’ lack of expertise? We consider an economy with investors (who vary in sophistication) and managers (who vary in skill). Unsophisticated investors’ lack of expertise makes it hard for them to distinguish skilled managers from unskilled ones. In the equilibrium that follows, investors exert little effort when searching for managers, leading to a suboptimal composition of managerial types entering the market. When unsophisticated investors are endowed with weak signals, they attempt to time their entry and exit from the market for managers, but their actions are predictable, so performance continues to suffer.

Heterogeneous liquidity providers and night-minus-day return predictability

Journal of Financial Economics 2023 148(3), 175-200 open access
We present and test a model to understand the puzzling fact that characteristics-sorted stock portfolios tend to earn opposite-signed overnight and intraday expected returns. Heterogeneous arbitrageurs – “fast” arbitrageurs with informational advantages and “slow” arbitrageurs with low inventory costs – compete to determine the price of liquidity. High information asymmetry around market open allows fast arbitrageurs to demand large price deviations for absorbing order imbalances, as cream-skimming risk discourages competition from slow arbitrageurs. Despite persistent order imbalances, these deviations attenuate when cream-skimming risk subsides, leading to opposite-signed overnight and intraday returns. Our model identifies novel determinants that empirically explain substantial variations in predictable overnight-minus-intraday returns.