We investigate whether banks’ initial responses during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in supporting their customers, communities, and governments were perceived as value-enhancing by investors. Using a unique responsible banking measure for a sample of the largest US and European commercial banks, we find a negative relationship between responsible bank behavior and stock market performance, particularly in the first wave of the pandemic. We also find that riskier banks were affected more negatively if they behaved responsibly. Overall, our findings show that banks’ responsible behavior during a crisis reduces, or at best is not relevant to, shareholder value.

We study bank branching dynamics across 3,143 US counties and 26 years. During the last decade, banks closed their branches at an unprecedented rate. At its peak in 2009, there were 90,783 branches. By 2020, this number has fallen by 12 percent. While technological factors correlate with these branching dynamics, bank fragility and consolidation are also strongly associated with changes in the number of branches (and their openings and closures). Interestingly, technological capabilities to service customers, such as online banking, seem less tightly linked to de-branching than technological capabilities to process internal information. Our analysis shows that large banks rely on internal technology to shed branches, while small banks close branches when they are vulnerable or consolidate.

How do banks offer and price mortgages when an online platform enables them to reach regions where they have no branches? With unique data on responses from differently located banks to each applying household and a shift-share instrument for market concentration, we find banks to make more and cheaper offers to more concentrated local markets. We rationalize this as investments in lucrative market shares given customer switching costs. Banks also improve their inter-regional portfolio diversification with more attractive offers to regions more complementary to their home locales. Finally, banks` choices become increasingly automated, reducing their operating costs.

What are the implications of an aging population for financial stability? To examine this question, we exploit geographic variation in aging across U.S. counties. We establish that banks with higher exposure to aging counties increase loan-to-income ratios. Laxer lending standards lead to higher nonperforming loans during downturns, suggesting higher credit risk. Inspecting the mechanism shows that aging drives risk-taking through two contemporaneous channels: deposit inflows due to seniors’ propensity to save in deposits; and depressed local investment opportunities due to seniors’ lower credit demand. Banks thus look for riskier clients, especially in counties where they operate no branches.

Using Iran’s unexpected flood in April 2019 as a natural experiment, we show that local branches bridge the time gap between the disaster and governmental aids by immediately increasing their lending for two months following the flood. Analyzing proprietary information on more than 53,000 farmers, we find that farmers with a stronger relationship with their branch - particularly younger and females - are more likely to receive a recovery loan. Our findings underscore that despite recent technological advancements, relationship-based branch banking is still important for agrarian societies during catastrophic events.

External imbalances played a pivotal role leading to the global financial crisis and were an important cause of turmoil. While current account (flow) imbalances narrowed in the aftermath of the crisis, the net international investment position (NIIP) (stock) imbalances persisted. This study explores the implications of countries’ net foreign positions on systemic risk. Using a sample of 470 banks located in 49 advanced economies, emerging countries, and developing economies over 2000–2020, we find robust empirical evidence that banks can reduce their systemic risk exposure when the countries in which they are incorporated improve their NIIPs and maintain creditor status vis-à-vis the rest of the world. However, only the equity component of the NIIP is responsible for this outcome, whereas debt flows are not significant. Similarly, we find that the mitigating effect of an external balance sheet on systemic risk is derived from valuation gains rather than from the incremental net acquisition of assets or liabilities represented by the current account. Our findings are particularly relevant for policymakers seeking to improve banks’ resilience to adverse shocks and maintain financial stability.

We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments (without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk). We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

We present a model of credit market competition to derive key hypotheses about how information sharing between banks influences the spatial clustering of their branches. We then test these hypotheses using data on 56,555 branches owned by 614 banks across 19 countries. We find that information sharing incentivizes banks to establish branches in localities that are new to them but that are already served by other banks. The resultant branch clustering is associated with reduced spatial credit rationing, as information sharing enables firms to access credit from more distant banks. These findings underscore how information sharing makes it more important for banks to move closer to each other rather than closer to their borrowers.

We investigate the impact of dividend policy on earnings quality and opportunistic earnings management for individual banks across 45 developed and developing countries between 1996 and 2019. Our estimates show that high dividend payments reduce earnings management, hence mitigate agency problems. This mitigation is especially prevalent among well-capitalised and non-listed banks. Greater investor protection and government regulation appear to strengthen the negative association between dividend policy and earnings management. Our results hold robustly across many different specifications.