<div> What is the impact on the cost of bank credit of local corporate environmental and biodiversity exposure? At loan origination, banks charge higher rates to firms creating more environmental damage, especially when they are lowly capitalized, and when the firms operate in “greener” states with lower climate denial and more negative environmental news. Biodiversity risk is also priced, especially when public interest in it intensifies. Following the Trump withdrawal from Paris, banks modulate their environmental risk pricing in “browner” states. In sum, environmental risk pricing in bank lending is also driven by local beliefs and attitudes. </div>

We investigate the transmission of monetary policy through the supply chains with US data on corporate linkages. Our analysis uncovers three key insights. First, contractionary monetary conditions lead to production disruptions in financially constrained rms. Second, these disruptions extend to the suppliers and customers of such firms. Third, disruptions intensify when financially constrained firms purchase or sell specialized goods. These findings suggest that monetary tightening creates bottlenecks in supply chains, forcing firms to curtail production when they cannot substitute their constrained business partners. \Monetary policy bottlenecks" amplify the impact ofmonetary policy beyond the standard balance sheet channel of transmission.

This study investigates the impact of skilled labor mobility on bank fragility. We construct a novel bank-level measure of skilled labor mobility using job-posting data and show that it significantly increases bank default probability. The effect is driven entirely by demand for risk officers, identifying risk management capacity as the specific mechanism. The effect is amplified by competition and is concentrated among banks experiencing net employee outflows. We further document that legal restrictions on labor mobility weaken the potential detrimental effect. Our findings indicate that skilled labor mobility exacerbates bank fragility, yet targeted policies can bolster resilience against possible adverse effects from labor market frictions.

We leverage differences in central bank independence and financial stability sentiment across countries to investigate the variability in banks’ stock market reactions to prudential policy announcements during the COVID-19 crisis. Our findings reveal that the relaxation of both macro- and micro-prudential policies leads to negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), the reaction being attenuated in countries where the central bank is more independent or communicates deteriorations in financial stability. The CARs around the announcement dates are 0.75 percentage points (pp) and 6.89 pp higher for macro- and micro-prudential policy announcements, respectively, in countries with greater central bank independence compared to those with lesser independence. The difference is approximately 3.73 pp and 5.65 pp between banks located in countries where the central bank communicates a negative sentiment about financial stability, compared to those where a positive sentiment is conveyed. The positive impact of higher degrees of central bank independence and deteriorations in financial stability sentiment on bank market valuation is enhanced for smaller banks, as well as for banks in countries with greater fiscal flexibility and a higher prevalence of privately owned banks. (181 words)

We examine whether the European Central Bank (ECB) President’s communication tone is systematically related to market-based measures of euro area bank risk. Using Loughran–McDonald dictionaries, we construct quarterly indicators of textual tone and readability from ECB presidential statements over 2008Q1–2024Q4. We link these indicators to country-level bank credit default swap (CDS) indices for euro area member states. Our analysis focuses on uncertainty-related and constraining language as communication dimensions especially relevant to financial stability. We estimate panel regressions with macro-financial controls, horse-race specifications, and deploy principal component analysis to distinguish overlapping sentiment dimensions, with additional robustness checks in first differences. A more uncertainty-laden and constraining ECB presidential tone is associated with higher bank CDS spreads, even after controlling for macro-financial fundamentals. Lower readability of ECB statements is likewise linked to greater bank stress, indicating that both the tone and the clarity of central bank communication matter for bank-risk pricing. The association between bank CDS spreads and ECB communication tone is more pronounced during turbulent than tranquil periods. Our findings are consistent with a sentiment-guidance channel through which central bank communication is reflected in perceptions of bank fragility beyond traditional policy and macro-financial factors. They indicate that the tone, complexity, and crisis-contingent framing of ECB communication are economically relevant for financial-stability pricing and the sovereign-bank nexus in the euro area.

Using an extensive matched hedge fund-prime broker panel dataset for the period 2001–2021, we document a strong positive relationship between hedge fund leverage and prime broker’s stock price crash risk after controlling for other crash risk drivers. Our results are not only statistically, but also economically significant, showing that a one-standard-deviation increase in hedge fund leverage is associated on average with an increase of around 5% of a standard deviation in the negative skewness or the down-to-up-volatility of bank stock returns. Moreover, they remain robust when accounting for endogeneity and conducting many robustness checks. We also document that some investment strategies, such as one focusing on fixed income, appear to decrease the slope of the risk metrics of prime brokers, and ultimately leading to lower stock price crash risk.

<div> We contribute to the relationship banking literature by uncovering the impact of a prior banking relationship on borrower's incentives to avoid default. As an identification strategy we exploit a proprietary dataset comprising 149,230 mortgage loans tracked monthly over a two-year period in a unique institutional setting that allows us to isolate the influence of borrower's incentives. Our findings indicate that a pre-existing relationship diminishes borrower's default risk by approximately 4%, exclusively attributable to the value of the relationship for the borrowers. This effect persists even during the notable surge in loan defaults during the COVID-19 pandemic. Our results also show that the impact of preexisting banking relationships on avoiding default is stronger for wealthier, more religious, and male borrowers. </div>

How do bankers treat green firms? Using unique loan application and banker preference data from a mid-sized bank, we find that customer managers, serving as front-line bankers, give more favorable recommendations to green firms, especially when they hold green values themselves. However, a minority of environmentally skeptical loan officers, aware through internal training that customer managers generally have greener preferences, counter this by downgrading positive evaluations of green firms. Despite not knowing the customer manager’s identity, these officers use their discretion to mitigate what they perceive as green biases, demonstrating the significant moderating role of superiors within the bank’s hierarchy.

We examine whether overconfident bank CEOs attenuate or amplify risk exposure amid heightened economic policy uncertainty. We find a pronounced risk amplification effect: banks led by overconfident CEOs exhibit significantly higher risk during high-EPU periods, with a one-standard-deviation increase in EPU raising risk exposure by 8%-20% across standard risk measures. This amplification does not operate through credit expansion or weaker provisioning. Instead, we identify a novel portfolio-composition mechanism: overconfident CEOs reallocate lending away from safer, loss-buffering loan categories toward riskier segments during periods of elevated uncertainty, leading to higher realized loan losses and weaker subsequent bank performance.