The impact of domestic and spillover macroeconomic news from the U.S., the Eurozone and China on national sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads and spread volatility are examined over a recent period of financial instability from November 2007 to March 2012. We find that better than expected (i.e. good) news tend to reduce sovereign CDS spreads, whilst worse than expected (i.e. bad) news increases spreads. News from the three major economies has significant spillover effects on other national sovereign CDS markets but the volatility responses to domestic news and foreign news from the major economies differ. CDS spread volatility increases in response to all domestic news and good news tends to exert relatively stronger effects than bad news. In contrast, good news from the major economies is market calming and consistently reduces spread volatility and they are also economically more important than bad news. Bad news from China and the Eurozone generally increase volatility in other sovereign CDS markets but bad news from the U.S. has been calming for other sovereign CDS markets in the extended crisis period from 2007 to 2012. Our results suggest that market participants in the market for sovereign credit protection pay more attention to good news than bad news both at home and from the major economies in times of financial instability.

We test the effectiveness of Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s foreign exchange interventions on conditional first and second moments of exchange rate returns and traded volumes, using a bivariate EGARCH model of the Yen/USD market from 5-13-1991 to 3-16-2004. We also estimate a friction model of BOJ’s intervention reaction function based on reducing short-term market disorderliness and supplementing domestic monetary policy. Important finding of this study are that: (i) we find ineffectiveness of BOJ interventions in influencing exchange rate trends pre-1995, in general, but effectiveness post-1995; (ii) FED intervention amplified the effectiveness of the BOJ transactions; (iii) interventions amplified market volatility and volumes through a ‘learning by trading’ process; (iv) BOJ’s interventions were based on ‘leaning against the wind’ motivations on the exchange rate trend and volumes; and (v) BOJ interventions were vigorously used in support of domestic monetary policy objectives post-1995. Though some of our findings confirm recent studies, our analysis goes deeper to provide new findings with important implications for central banks and foreign exchange market participants.

We investigate the effects of credit ratings-contingent financial regulation on foreign bank lending behavior. We examine the sensitivity of international bank flows to debtor countries’ sovereign credit rating changes before and after the implementation of the Basel 2 risk-based capital regulatory rules. We study the quarterly bilateral flows from G-10 creditor banking systems to 77 recipient countries over the period Q4:1999 to Q2:2013. We find direct evidence that sovereign credit re-ratings that lead to changes in risk-weights for capital adequacy requirements have become more significant since the implementation of Basel 2 rules for assessing banks’ credit risk under the standardized approach. This evidence is consistent with global banks acting via their international lending decisions to minimize required capital charges associated with the use of ratings-contingent regulation. We find no evidence to suggest that banking regulation induced foreign lending has heightened the perceived sovereign credit risks of recipient countries.

This paper examines the dynamic relationship between daily stock and government bond returns of selected countries over the past decade to infer the state and progress of inter-financial market integration. We proceed to empirically investigate the influence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on time variations in inter-stock–bond market integration/segmentation dynamics using a two-step procedure: First, we document the downward trends in time-varying conditional correlations between stock and bond market returns in European countries, Japan and the US. Second, we investigate the causality and determinants of this interdependent relationship, in particular, whether the various macroeconomic convergence criteria associated with the EMU have played a significant role. We find that real economic integration and the reduction in currency risk have generally had the desired effect on financial integration but monetary policy integration may have created uncertain investor sentiments on the economic future of the EMU, thereby stimulating a flight to quality phenomenon.

We examine the influence of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on the dynamic process of stock market integration over the period 2 January 1989–29 May 2003 using a bivariate EGARCH framework with time-varying conditional correlations. We find that there has been a clear regime shift in European stock market integration with the introduction of the EMU. The EMU has been necessary for stock market integration as unidirectional causality was found. Linear systems regression analysis shows that the increase in both regional and global stock market integration over this period was significantly driven in part, by macroeconomic convergence associated with the introduction of the EMU and financial development levels.

We examine the effect of sovereign credit impairments on the pricing of syndicated loans following rating downgrades in the borrowing firms' countries of domicile. We find that the sovereign ceiling policies used by credit rating agencies create a disproportionately adverse impact on the bounded firms' borrowing costs relative to other domestic firms following their sovereign's rating downgrade. Rating-based regulatory frictions partially explain our results. On the supply-side, loans carry a higher spread when granted from low-capital banks, non-bank lenders, and banks with high market power. We further document an operating demand-side channel, contingent on borrowers' size, financial constraints, and global diversification. Our results can be attributed to the relative bargaining power between lenders and borrowers: relationship borrowers and non-bank dependent borrowers with alternative financing sources are much less affected.

In this paper we quantify the differences between market and regulatory assessments of bank portfolio risk, and thereby demonstrate that larger differences significantly reduce corporate lending rates. Specifically, to entice borrowers, banks reduce spreads by approximately 4.3% following a one standard deviation increase in our measure for bank asset-risk differences. This is equivalent to an interest income loss of USD 2.03 million on a loan of average size and duration. The separate effects of market and regulatory risk are much less potent. Our study reveals a disciplinary-competition effect in favor of corporate borrowers when there is information asymmetry between investors and bank regulators.