Using unique consumer financial transactions of more than 56,000 consumers, we study the consumption response to a housing policy experiment in Singapore that resulted in a decrease in access to home equity. Using difference-in-differences analysis, we find a significant negative consumption response to the policy shock. Moreover, the consumption response is concentrated in credit card spending and is stronger among individuals with limited access to credit market or with a high precautionary saving motive. These results suggest that a decrease in access to home equity reduces the role of housing as a self-insurance mechanism for consumption smoothing.

Institutions often offer a menu of contracts to consumers in an attempt to create a separating equilibrium that reveals borrower types and provides better pricing. We test the effectiveness of a specific set of contracts in the mortgage market: mortgage points. Points allow borrowers to exchange an upfront amount for a decrease in the mortgage rate. We document that, on average, points takers lose about $700. Also, points takers are less financially savvy (less educated, older), and they make mistakes on other dimensions (e.g., inefficiently refinancing their mortgages). Overall, our results show that borrowers overestimate how long they will stay with the mortgage.

This paper uses a dataset from a leading American subprime lender, which contains detailed information on borrower and loan characteristics. We find that financial professionals are less likely to become delinquent. This effect cannot be explained by borrower characteristics, such as income, education, loan terms, property characteristics, geographic effects, or strategic default. We also find variation in the effect of working in a financial profession across borrowers of different ages and income levels. We discuss explanations for these results.

We evaluate the effects of the 2009 Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) that provided intermediaries with sizable financial incentives to renegotiate mortgages. HAMP increased intensity of renegotiations and prevented a substantial number of foreclosures but reached just one-third of its targeted indebted households. This shortfall was in large part due to low renegotiation intensity of a few large intermediaries and was driven by intermediary-specific factors. Exploiting regional variation in the intensity of program implementation by intermediaries suggests that the program was associated with a lower rate of foreclosures, consumer debt delinquencies, house price declines, and an increase in durable spending.