We study a controlled experiment in which a bank's loan officers were incentivized based on originated loan volume to encourage prospecting for new business. While treated loan officers did attract new applications, both extensive and intensive margins of loan origination expanded (+ 31% new loans; loan size + 15%). We find that loan officers gave greater weight to hard information in approval decisions. Despite no change in the observable characteristics of approved loans, their default rate increased (+ 24%). Finally, the bank's imputed credit default model lost its predictive power. Overall, loan prospecting incentives led to unfavorable soft information being overlooked in the origination process.

This paper shows how liquidity infusions affect loan modification in the mortgage market. The design of pooling and servicing agreements leads mortgage servicers to prefer foreclosure over modification when they are liquidity constrained. Therefore, a positive liquidity shock is expected to boost modification rates. Using a residential mortgage dataset that includes loan-level information, we find that the Troubled Asset Relief Program significantly increased the modification rate. Our findings help us better understand the economic consequences of government intervention and have important policy implications for the renegotiation of distressed mortgages.

Gender gap can arise due to various factors—socio-economic, culture, risk attitudes, and macro-economic circumstances. Using a unique dataset that merges motor vehicle events with bankruptcy outcomes and personal data from Singapore, this study finds significant evidence of a gender gap in personal bankruptcy risk. We show that women’s odds of being involved in bankruptcy events are 28% of those of men after controlling for demographic variables, housing type, cultural and spatial fixed effects. Using motor vehicle accidents as an instrument, we confirm that the gender gap in bankruptcy risk is mainly driven by risk-taking behavior. The heterogeneity analyses show that culture also explains part of the difference. Chinese, Indian, and Malay women have differential bankruptcy rates in Singapore.

This paper adopts a novel approach to examine the roles of gender difference and intra-household economic power in mortgage signing order. We develop an “economic power” index based on relative economic power within the same-sex couple households. We then use this measure along with gender identity and other factors to explain signing order in different-gender couples. Our results suggest that, while pure economic power explains much of the observed signing order, gender difference plays an important role. Analysis exploiting regional variation reveals that gender difference in signing order is greater in states with a larger gender wage gap and red states whose residents predominantly vote for the Republican.

The U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee considered many important banking reforms in 2009 to 2010. We show that, during this period, foreclosure starts on delinquent mortgages were delayed in the districts of committee members although there was no difference in delinquency rates between committee and noncommittee districts. In these areas, banks delayed the foreclosure starts by 0.5 months (relative to the 12‐month average). The estimated cost of delay to lenders is an order of magnitude greater than the campaign contributions by the political action committees of the largest mortgage servicing banks to the committee members in that period.

We propose a new approach to studying the pass-through of credit expansion policies that focuses on frictions, such as asymmetric information, that arise in the interaction between banks and borrowers. We decompose the effect of changes in banks’ cost of funds on aggregate borrowing into the product of banks’ marginal propensity to lend (MPL) to borrowers and those borrowers’ marginal propensity to borrow (MPB), aggregated over all borrowers in the economy. We apply our framework by estimating heterogeneous MPBs and MPLs in the U.S. credit card market. Using panel data on 8.5 million credit cards and 743 credit limit regression discontinuities, we find that the MPB is declining in credit score, falling from 59% for consumers with FICO scores below 660 to essentially zero for consumers with FICO scores above 740. We use a simple model of optimal credit limits to show that a bank’s MPL depends on a small number of parameters that can be estimated using our credit limit discontinuities. For the lowest FICO score consumers, higher credit limits sharply reduce profits from lending, limiting banks’ optimal MPL to these consumers. The negative correlation between MPB and MPL reduces the impact of changes in banks’ cost of funds on aggregate household borrowing, and highlights the importance of frictions in bank-borrower interactions for understanding the pass-through of credit expansions.