This paper studies the acquisition and subsequent utilization of production capacity in a multidivisional firm. In a setting where an upstream division provides capacity services for itself and a downstream division, our analysis explores whether the divisions should be structured as investment or profit centers. The choice of responsibility centers is naturally linked to the internal pricing rules for capacity services. As a benchmark, we establish the efficiency of an arrangement in which the upstream division is organized as an investment center, and capacity services to the downstream division are priced at full historical cost. Such responsibility center arrangements may, however, be vulnerable to dynamic hold-up problems whenever the divisional capacity assignments are fungible in the short-run, and therefore, it is essential to let divisional managers negotiate over their actual capacity assignments. The dynamic hold-up problem can be alleviated with more symmetric choice of responsibility centers. The firm can centralize ownership of capacity assets with the provision that both divisions rent capacity on a periodic basis from a central unit. An alternative and more decentralized solution is obtained by a system of bilateral capacity ownership in which both divisions become investment centers.

ABSTRACT In this article we develop a multiperiod agency model to study the role of leading indicator variables in managerial performance measures. In addition to the familiar moral hazard problem, the principal faces the task of motivating a manager to undertake “soft” investments. These investments are not directly contractible, but the principal can instead rely on leading indicator variables that provide a noisy forecast of the investment returns to be received in future periods. Our analysis relates the role of leading indicator variables to the duration of the manager's incentive contract. With short‐term contracts, leading indicator variables are essential in mitigating a holdup problem resulting from the fact that investments are sunk at the end of the first period. With long‐term contracts, leading indicator variables will be valuable if the manager's compensation schemes are not stationary over time. The leading indicator variables then become an instrument for matching the future investment return with the current investment expenditure. We identify conditions under which the optimal long‐term contract induces larger investments and less reliance on the leading indicator variables as compared with short‐term contracts. Under certain conditions, though, the principal does better with a sequence of one‐period contracts than with a long‐term contract.

We develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting. Earnings management is modeled as a “window dressing” action that can increase the firm’s reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm’s real cash flows. Earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager’s communication of the firm’s future cash flows. We show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings. We also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts. Finally, our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management. Earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the Revelation Principle. By contrast, in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted. Nonetheless, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts.

This paper considers an agency model in which a firm's manager receives private information about an investment project. The manager has unique skills that are essential for implementing the project, and he can pursue the project inside the firm or as an outside venture on his own. The firm's owner thus faces a potential managerial retention problem, where the severity of the retention problem depends on the project's outside viability. My analysis shows that if the managerial retention problem is not too severe, the owner can delegate the investment decision to the manager and use a residua-lincome-based bonus contract to give the manager incentives to work hard and make appropriate investment decisions. If the retention problem is severe, however, then the owner must use an option-based compensation contract to retain the manager and provide him with appropriate incentives. I also establish that as the managerial retention problem becomes more severe, the owner reduces the rate of return, or hurdle rate, required to approve the investment project. These results predict that new-economy firms, in which managerial expertise is critical and yet mobile, are more likely to (1) include stock options in their managers' compensation contracts, and (2) apply lower hurdle rates for approving capital investments.

This paper develops a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a manager must be given incentives to undertake investments and to exert personally costly effort. Investments are “soft” (e.g., intangible assets) and therefore entail measurement errors for the accounting system as it seeks to separate investments from operating expenditures. This separation is of no concern to the stock market, which draws on its own information about future cash flows resulting from current investments. The firm's stock price, however, reflects all value-relevant information, parts of which are not incentive relevant. Optimal incentive provisions must combine “forward-looking” market information with “backward-looking” accounting information. Under certain conditions, optimal performance measures can be expressed as a weighted average of economic value added (residual income) and market value added.

This paper investigates how competition for scarce corporate resources impacts innovation incentives within multidivisional firms and, consequently, shapes firms’ preferences for fostering or restricting intra-firm competition. In our model, divisions become privately informed about the potential value of new investment opportunities generated through their innovation initiatives. We demonstrate that intra-firm competition unambiguously reduces divisions’ ex ante innovation incentives. However, it benefits ex post resource allocation by enabling the firm to (i) select the most promising project and (ii) limit the rents divisions earn from their private information. Consequently, a firm’s preference to limit or encourage interdivisional competition hinges on balancing ex post allocative efficiency, which favors increased intra-firm competition, against ex ante innovation incentives, which favor reduced competition. Our analysis identifies plausible conditions under which each organizational design—competitive or exclusive innovation—emerges as the optimal choice.