[In this article we construct a model in which a consumer's utility depends on the consumption history. We describe a general equilibrium framework similar to Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a). A simple example is then solved in closed form in this general equilibrium setting to rationalize the observed stickiness of the consumption series relative to the fluctuations in stock market wealth. The sample paths of consumption generated from this model imply lower variability in consumption growth rates compared to those generated by models with separable utility functions. We then present a partial equilibrium model similar to Merton (1969, 1971) and extend Merton's results on optimal consumption and portfolio rules to accommodate nonseparability in preferences. Asset pricing implications of our framework are briefly explored.]

The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries, and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game-theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bargaining powers to the two claimants. Two formulations of reorganization are presented: debt-equity swaps and strategic debt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions. We study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies and distinguish liquidity-induced defaults from strategic defaults. We derive optimal equity issuance and payout policies. The debt capacity of the firm and the optimal capital structure are characterized.

In this article we construct a model in which a consumer's utility depends on the consumption history. We describe a general equilibrium framework similar to Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985a). A simple example is then solved in closed form in this general equilibrium setting to rationalize the observed stickiness of the consumption series relative to the fluctuations in stock market wealth. The sample paths of consumption generated from this model imply lower variability in consumption growth rates compared to those generated by models with separable utility functions. We then present partial equilibrium model similar to Merton (1969, 1971) and extend Merton's results on optimal consumption and portfolio rules to accommodate nonseparability in preferences. Asset pricing implications of our framework are briefly explored.

I survey and assess the development of continuous‐time methods in finance during the last 30 years. The subperiod 1969 to 1980 saw a dizzying pace of development with seminal ideas in derivatives securities pricing, term structure theory, asset pricing, and optimal consumption and portfolio choices. During the period 1981 to 1999 the theory has been extended and modified to better explain empirical regularities in various subfields of finance. This latter subperiod has seen significant progress in econometric theory, computational and estimation methods to test and implement continuous‐time models. Capital market frictions and bargaining issues are being increasingly incorporated in continuous‐time theory.

A framework for valuing floating-rate notes is developed to examine the effects of (1) lags in the coupon formula, (2) special contractual features and (3) default risk. Evidence from a sample of floaters indicates they sold at significant discounts. While lags in the coupon formulas and other contractual features make these notes more variable, they do not account for the magnitude of the discounts. We conclude that the fixed default premium in the coupon formula of a typical note is inadequate to compensate for time-varying default premiums demanded by investors, who treat other corporate short-term paper as close substitutes.

The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries, and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game-theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bargaining powers to the two claimants. Two formulations of reorganization are presented: debt-equity swaps and strategic debt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions. We study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies and distinguish liquidity-induced defaults from strategic defaults. We derive optimal equity issuance and payout policies. The debt capacity of the firm and the optimal capital structure are characterized.

Rational restrictions are derived for the values of American options on futures contracts. For these options, the optimal policy, in general, involves premature exercise. A model is developed for valuing options on futures contracts in a constant interest rate setting. Despite the fact that premature exercise may be optimal, the value of this American feature appears to be small and a European formula due to Black serves as a useful approximation. Finally, a model is developed to value these options in a world with stochastic interest rates. It is shown that the pricing errors caused by ignoring the location of the interest rate (relative to its long‐run mean) range from −5% to 7%, when the current rate is ±200 basis points from its long‐run value. The role of interest rate expectations is, therefore, crucial to the valuation. Optimal exercise policies are found from numerical methods for both models.

We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auction awards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second, we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner’s curse–driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies. Third, we explore the extent to which the received theories of multiunit auctions are able to offer insights into the bidder behavior we observe. Our empirical evidence is consistent with some of the predictions of the models of auctions that emphasize private information, the winner’s curse and the champion’s plague. While the models of multiunit auctions serve as useful guideposts, our empirical findings also point to several new areas of research in multiunit auctions that are of policy and theoretical interest.