Around the world, investors, practitioners, regulators and policy makers seek to understand whether, when and why recently listed stocks, initial public offerings (IPOs) are delisted rather than continue trading (survive). Using data on 7,627 IPOs issued during 2000–2008 across 32 countries, we explore the impact of the legal system on IPO survival. We find that IPOs in countries with better investor protections remain listed for longer. This suggests that better legal systems increase the net benefits companies derive from staying listed. We also provide evidence that better legal systems increase the effectiveness of IPO certification by venture capitalists, underwriters and auditors.

We examine the impact of incentive fees paid to IPO underwriters at issuers' discretion on IPO pricing and short-term performance. We expect that better-incentivized underwriters produce more information required for IPO pricing reducing underwriters' reliance on investors' information production which requires compensation through IPO underpricing. Using a novel dataset, we find that incentive compensation mitigates the partial-adjustment phenomenon. IPOs with stronger incentives have more informative price ranges, higher price revisions, longer road shows and lower initial returns largely due to interaction effects between underwriters' incentives and their information-production capabilities. Using a battery of tests and addressing endogeneity, our results remain robust.

Can companies reduce the volatility and increase the liquidity of their stocks by trading them? In the context of the Italian stock market, where companies have far more leeway to sell as well as buy their own stocks than in the U.S., the answer is yes. We examine the effects of trading (open-market share repurchases and treasury shares sales) on liquidity (bid–ask spread) and volatility (return variance). Further, we examine the impact of shareholder approvals of repurchase programs on liquidity and volatility. We find clear evidence that trading increases liquidity and reduces volatility. These results are consistent with our analysis of the motives Italian companies give for making share repurchases.

We compare and contrast the performance of cross-border and domestic venture capital (VC) investments in terms of the time it takes VC backers to exit portfolio companies through initial public offering (IPO), trade sale (M&A), or other routes. Initial analysis suggests that cross-border investments are exited more quickly than domestic investments, and this difference is driven by the cross-border investments in North America. We explore whether the difference between domestic and cross-border exits can be explained by regional variations in economic/market activity and legal systems. We find it is important to allow for the impact of these macro variables on the time to VC exit to vary across regions. This is crucial not just to capture the full impact of the macro factors, but also to explain the differences in time to exit between domestic and cross-border investments.

We study how investors respond to ‘superficial’ mutual-fund name changes that occur for no fundamental reasons. We find that such name changes remain widespread even after regulation to curb potentially misleading name changes (SEC Rule 35d-1). Superficial changes are more widespread than previously studied ‘misleading’ changes that are not accompanied by corresponding portfolio adjustments reflecting the investment style suggested by the new name. Superficial changes appear to be driven by managerial incentives. Investors react to superficial changes with increased fund flows but appear to gain no benefit through improved performance or lower fees. On the contrary, name-change funds underperform as a group. Our findings highlight inefficiencies in the mutual-fund market and hold important implications for the stakeholders involved.

Recent U.S. policy encourages anchor investments to facilitate initial public offerings (IPOs) and increase companies' access to external finance. As access to external funds relies on stocks remaining listed, we study anchor investors' impact on how long IPOs stay listed. We examine two types of anchor investors in Hong Kong: strategic and cornerstone investors, that are similar to U.S. anchor investors, but show varying levels of commitment to the IPO. We find that IPOs backed by more committed investors, with longer post-IPO commitments (lockups), stay listed longer. This suggests that the success of U.S. policies may require investors' commitment.

Against the backdrop of a severe financial crisis and extensive restructuring of the financial sector, we investigate the evolution and determinants of connections between firms and banks, and the impact of bank connections on corporate investment. Our study examines Thai non-financial companies during 1995–2000, a period straddling the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. Before the crisis, bank-connections are common and associated with significantly lower sensitivity of corporate investment to internal cash flow. After the crisis, and following substantial changes in bank ownership and governance due to financial-sector reforms and restructuring, far fewer firms are bank-connected and connections no longer affect investment–cash flow sensitivity.

We analyze detailed monthly data on U.S. open market stock repurchases (OMRs) that recently became available following stricter disclosure requirements. We find evidence that OMRs are timed to benefit non-selling shareholders. We present evidence that the profits to companies from timing repurchases are significantly related to ownership structure. Institutional ownership reduces companies' opportunities to repurchase stock at bargain prices. At low levels, insider ownership increases timing profits and at high levels it reduces them. Stock liquidity increases profits from timing OMRs.