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A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information

Review of Economic Studies 1992 59(1), 187
Multiplicity of sequential equilibria is a common problem in bargaining models with incomplete information in which the informed player makes an offer. Most of these equilibria are supported by optimistic conjectures by the uninformed player. This paper reexamines the bargaining model in Rubinstein (1953). Monotonicity restrictions are placed on off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs to exclude equilibria supported by optimistic conjectures. Sequential equilibria that survive these restrictions are characterized.

A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades

Journal of Political Economy 1992 100(5), 992-1026
An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information. We argue that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades.

A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades

Journal of Political Economy 1992 100(5), 992-1026 open access
An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information. We argue that localized conformity of behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by informational cascades.