Credit default swaps can be used to lower the capital requirements of dealer banks entering into uncollateralized derivatives positions with sovereigns. We show in a model that the regulatory incentive to obtain capital relief makes CDS contracts valuable to dealer banks and empirically that, consistent with the use of CDS for regulatory purposes, there is a disconnect between changes in bond yield spreads and in CDS premiums, especially for safe sovereigns. Additional empirical tests related to the volume of contracts outstanding, effects of regulatory proxies, and the corporate bond and CDS markets support that CDS contracts are used for capital relief.

Pension funds use interest rate swaps to hedge the interest rate risk arising from their liabilities. Analyzing regulatory data on Dutch pension funds, we show that pension funds with worse funding ratios, indicating greater fragility, use swaps more aggressively. These swap positions expose pension funds to the risk of margin calls, which can exceed 6% of their total assets, when interest rates rise. Pension funds respond to realized margin calls by selling safe government bonds with medium-term maturities. This procyclical selling behavior adversely affects the prices of the sold bonds and thereby exposes pension funds to market liquidity risk.

The transition from London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) affects the reference rate of floating-rate debt worth trillions of dollars. We provide the first evidence highlighting a benefit of the benchmark transition for debt markets. Focusing on the market for dollar-denominated floating rate notes (FRNs), we compare the yield spreads of FRNs linked to LIBOR and SOFR, issued by the same entity during the same month. After adjusting for the maturity-matched spreads from derivatives markets, we find significantly lower spreads for SOFR-linked FRNs. We link this SOFR discount to the enhanced price stability of SOFR-linked FRNs.

We examine the alternative reference rates that are set to replace the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as benchmark rate by the end of 2021. After providing the relevant background, we show that: (i) depending on the marginal lenders, tighter regulatory constraints can either increase or decrease the alternative benchmarks; (ii) increases in the amount of government debt outstanding increase the alternative benchmarks, more so for collateralized rates; and (iii) more central bank reserves lower the alternative benchmarks. In addition, we show that term rates based on the alternative reference rates can be detached from banks’ marginal funding costs.

Credit default swaps can be used to lower the capital requirements of dealer banks entering into uncollateralized derivatives positions with sovereigns. We show in a model that the regulatory incentive to obtain capital relief makes CDS contracts valuable to dealer banks and empirically that, consistent with the use of CDS for regulatory purposes, there is a disconnect between changes in bond yield spreads and in CDS premiums, especially for safe sovereigns. Additional empirical tests related to the volume of contracts outstanding, effects of regulatory proxies, and the corporate bond and CDS markets support that CDS contracts are used for capital relief. (

The 30‐year U.S. swap spreads have been negative since September 2008. We offer a novel explanation for this persistent anomaly. Through an illustrative model, we show that underfunded pension plans optimally use swaps for duration hedging. Combined with dealer banks' balance sheet constraints, this demand can drive swap spreads to become negative. Empirically, we construct a measure of the aggregate funding status of defined benefit pension plans and show that this measure helps explain 30‐year swap spreads. We find a similar link between pension funds' underfunding and swap spreads for two other regions.

Using a novel dataset of leveraged loan trades executed by managers of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), we document the importance of “active loan trades” – trades executed at a manager’s discretion. More active trading increases the returns to CLO equity investors, lowers collateral portfolio default rates, and increases the manager’s chances of closing a new deal. Examining the observed loan trades, we find that more active CLOs trade at better prices than less active CLOs, selling leveraged loans earlier and before they get downgraded. Our findings suggest that more active CLOs are better at anticipating deteriorations in loan credit quality.