I present the fact that wage gaps due to firm size increase with job responsibility. I use Swedish data to determine whether wage gaps increase with a direct measure of job responsibility, to compare the age patterns of the wage gaps for blue‐ and white‐collar workers, and to compare wages by job responsibility and spans of control. With U.S. data, I compare supervisory to nonsupervisory occupations and find that wage gaps increase with job responsibility for most occupational ladders. This fact is consistent with hierarchical matching models in which the larger number of subordinates amplifies managerial talent.

I exploit Moody's 1982 credit rating refinement to examine its effects on firms’ credit market access, financing decisions, and investment policies. While firms’ ex ante yield spread can partially predict the direction of refinement changes, firms with refinement upgrades experience an additional decrease in their ex post borrowing cost compared with firms with downgrades. The former subsequently also issue more debt and rely more on debt financing over equity than the latter. Lastly, upgraded firms have more capital investments, less cash accumulation, and faster asset growth than downgraded firms. These findings show that credit market information asymmetry significantly affects firms’ real outcomes.

This paper examines the relationship between UK equity returns and short-term interest rates using a two regime Markov-Switching EGARCH model. The results suggest one high-return, low variance regime within which the conditional variance of equity returns responds persistently but symmetrically to equity return innovations. In the other, low-mean, high variance, regime equity volatility responds asymmetrically and without persistence to shocks to equity returns. There is evidence of a regime dependent relationship between shorter maturity interest rate differentials and equity return volatility. Furthermore, there is evidence that events in the money markets influence the probability of transition across regimes.

We investigate cross-market trading dynamics in futures contracts written on seemingly unrelated commodities that are consumed by a common industry. On the Tokyo Commodity Exchange, we find such evidence in natural rubber (NR), palladium (PA) and gasoline (GA) futures markets. The automobile industry is responsible for more than 50% of global demand for each of these commodities. VAR estimation reveals short-run cross-market interaction between NR and GA, and from NR to PA. Cross-market influence exerted by PA is felt in longer dynamics, with PA volatility (volume) affecting NR (GA) volume (volatility). Our findings are robust to lag-specification, volatility measure, and consistent with full BEKK-GARCH estimation results. Further analysis, which benchmarks against silver futures market, TOCOM index and TOPIX transportation index, confirms that our results are driven by a common industry exposure, and not a commodity market factor. A simple trading rule that incorporates short-run GA and long-run PA dynamics to predict NR return yields positive economic profit. Our study offers new insights into how commodity and equity markets relate at an industry level, and implications for multi-commodity hedging.

This paper explores the relevance of capital market supply frictions for corporate capital structure decisions. To identify this relationship, I study the effect on firms' financial structures of two changes in bank funding constraints: the 1961 emergence of the market for certificates of deposit, and the 1966 Credit Crunch. Following an expansion (contraction) in the availability of bank loans, leverage ratios of bank-dependent firms significantly increase (decrease) relative to firms with bond market access. Concurrent changes in the composition of financing sources lend further support to the role of credit supply and debt market segmentation in capital structure choice.

This paper is written with two goals in mind. The first is to offer a critical discussion of papers by Bauguess, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Zutter [Bauguess, Scott, Moeller, Sara, Schlingemann, Frederich and Zutter, Chad, 2009. Ownership structure and target returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, this issue], and Offenberg [Offenberg, David, 2009. Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. Journal of Corporate Finance, this issue], both of which appear in this special issue. The second goal is to offer some perspectives about new questions that these papers bring to light.

Management know-how shapes the productivity of firms and can be reallocated across countries as managers acquire control of factors of production abroad. We construct a quantitative model to investigate the aggregate consequences of the international reallocation of management know-how. Using aggregate data, we infer the relative scarcity of this form of know-how in a sample of developing countries. We find that developing countries gain, on average, 12% in output and 5% in welfare (with wide variation across countries) when they eliminate policy barriers to foreign control of domestic factors of production.

[Using a novel information asymmetry index based on measures of adverse selection developed by the market microstructure literature, we test whether information asymmetry is an important determinant of capital structure decisions, as suggested by the pecking order theory. Our index relies exclusively on measures of the market's assessment of adverse selection risk rather than on ex ante firm characteristics. We find that information asymmetry does affect the capital structure decisions of U. S. firms over the sample period 1973-2002. Our findings are robust to controlling for conventional leverage factors (size, tangibility, Q ratio, profitability), the sources of firms' financing needs, and such firm attributes as stock return volatility, stock turnover, and intensity of insider trading. For example, we estimate that on average, for every dollar of financing deficit to cover, firms in the highest adverse selection decile issue 30 cents of debt more than firms in the lowest decile. Overall, this evidence explains why the pecking order theory is only partially successful in explaining all of firms' capital structure decisions. It also suggests that the theory finds support when its basic assumptions hold in the data, as should reasonably be expected of any theory.]

This paper investigates whether leveraged buyouts (LBOs) increase the bargaining power of firms with their suppliers. We find that suppliers to LBO firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns at the announcements of downstream LBOs. We also find that suppliers who have likely made substantial relationship-specific investments are more negatively affected, both in terms of abnormal stock returns and reduced profit margins, than suppliers of commodity products or transitory suppliers. Interestingly, leveraged recapitalization announcements are not associated with negative returns to suppliers, suggesting that increased leverage without an accompanying change in organizational form does not, on average, lead to price concessions from suppliers.