We find that analysts' forecast errors are predicted by past accounting accruals (adjustments to cash flows to obtain reported earnings) among both equity issuers and nonissuers. Analysts are more optimistic for the subsequent four years for issuers reporting higher issue-year accruals. The predictive power is greater for discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and is independent of the presence of an underwriting affiliation. Predicted forecast errors from accruals significantly explain the long-term under performance of new issuers. The predictability of forecast errors among nonissuers suggests that analysts' credulity about accruals management more generally contributes to market inefficiency.

This study examines the relations between earnings informativeness, measured by the earnings–return relation, and the ownership structure of 977 companies in seven East Asian economies. Our results are consistent with two complementary explanations. First, concentrated ownership and the associated pyramidal and cross-holding structures create agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside investors. Consequently, controlling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-interested purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility to outside investors. Second, concentrated ownership is associated with low earnings informativeness as ownership concentration prevents leakage of proprietary information about the firms’ rent-seeking activities.

We find that analysts’ forecast errors are predicted by past accounting accruals (adjustments to cash flows to obtain reported earnings) among both equity issuers and nonissuers. Analysts are more optimistic for the subsequent four years for issuers reporting higher issue-year accruals. The predictive power is greater for discretionary accruals than nondiscretionary accruals and is independent of the presence of an underwriting affiliation. Predicted forecast errors from accruals significantly explain the long-term underperformance of new issuers. The predictability of forecast errors among nonissuers suggests that analysts’ credulity about accruals management more generally contributes to market inefficiency.