We report the first results for Japanese firms on the effects of employee stock-ownership plans (ESOP's) and bonuses by estimating production functions using new panel data. We find that the introduction of an ESOP will lead to a 4-5-percent increase in productivity; this productivity payoff takes 3-4 years. There is a modest productivity gain from the bonus system. We also find evidence that the productivity effect of bonuses is enhanced by the existence of ESOP's, suggesting that ESOP's may create a climate conducive to profit-sharing by enhancing long-term commitment and peer monitoring.

The authors report the first results for Japanese firms on the effects of employee stock-ownership plans (ESOPs) and bonuses by estimating production functions using new panel data. They find that the introduction of an ESOP will lead to a 4-5 percent increase in productivity; this productivity payoff takes three to four years. There is a modest productivity gain from the bonus system. The authors also find evidence that the productivity effect of bonuses is enhanced by the existence of ESOPs, suggesting that ESOPs may create a climate conducive to profit-sharing by enhancing long-term commitment and peer monitoring.

In October 2003, the United States drastically reduced the number of H-1B visas available for foreign-born workers. Such restrictions could make U.S. colleges less attractive to foreign students considering an American education as a pathway to U.S. employment. Citizens from five countries are de facto exempt from the visa restrictions, however. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that restrictive immigration policy reduced SAT scores of international applicants by about 1.5% and decreased the number of SAT score reports sent by international students at the top quintile of the SAT score distribution. Restrictive immigration policy disproportionately discourages high-ability international students from pursuing education in the United States.

Executive turnover and its link to firm performance can provide a crucial measure of how effectively a firm solves the two sets of principal-agent problems: (a) the diverging interests between top management and shareholders, which may result in managerial entrenchment; and (b) the diverging interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which may lead to the expropriation of the latter by the former or “tunneling,” as referred to in the literature. Tying the personal fortune of top executives to the firm’s performance aligns the interests of shareholders and those of management. It also breaks up the “insider” alliance between the controlling shareholder and management, thereby helping protect the interests of minority shareholders. Although there is a large literature on executive turnover in Western firms, research on executive turnover in non-Western firms is limited, and this paper is the only one on China. A closer look at the executive turnoverperformance link in China (one of the two major internal discipline mechanisms in corporate governance) is particularly relevant, since effective markets for corporate control are missing in China, the largest developing and transitional economy in the world. Furthermore, China is an interesting case because both types of agency problems are acute due to poorly defined property rights and weak investor protection, which result largely from its command economy legacy.

Using Danish registry data linked to the Labor Force Survey, we provide the first rigorous evidence with external validity on the hours-career nexus (positive association between hours and career success). Guided by three theories (human capital; rat race; tournament), we unpack the hours-career nexus through examining: the differential effect of hours in the present firm and elsewhere; hours relative to peers’ hours; standard vs. evening/night/weekend hours; and the importance of sustaining long hours. Supplemented by the time use survey, we show the gender gap in hours and career success is due mostly to gendered division of labor in household production.