The experiences of the financial crises in the United States recently and in Japan in the 1990s suggest two lessons for future financial regulations. First, the lack of an orderly resolution mechanism for large and complex financial institutions created serious problems. Second, it is important to distinguish between individual financial institutions' health and stability of the whole financial system. Policy recommendations in the Squam Lake Report address these issues well. The Dodd–Frank Act could provide an effective regulatory framework to implement these recommendations, but the success depends on the details of the regulations that have not been specified. (JEL E44, E52, G01, G21, G28, L51)

The paper provides a critical review of the Financial Services Agency (FSA) of Japan since its establishment in June 1998 (as the Financial Supervisory Agency) to June 2004. During the six year period, the FSA faced the challenge of addressing severe insolvency problems in banking as well as life insurance industries. The paper argues that the initial separation of the supervisory role (in the Financial Supervisory Agency and the Financial Reconstruction Commission) and the policy planning role (in the Ministry of Finance) was useful in the sense it allowed the FSA to have a firm stance on the insolvency problem that was partially created by the failure of the past financial regulatory policy. Even after the creation of the FSA, the Bank of Japan remained as another bank supervisor. This seems have made the central bank reluctant in relaxing monetary policy out of the fear that such loose monetary policy would actually discourage re-organization of banking industry. This suggests a problem of having the central bank as a bank supervisor. For the life insurance companies, the FSA (both old and new) has not been successful in intervening (using prompt corrective action) before the failures. Finally, the paper also points out the important role of the leadership at the FSA that shapes the financial regulation, and suggests a problem of appointing a politician to this role.

During the financial crisis that started in 2007, the U.S. government has used a variety of tools to try to rehabilitate the U.S. banking industry. Many of those strategies were also used in Japan to combat its banking problems in the 1990s. There are also a surprising number of other similarities between the current U.S. crisis and the recent Japanese crisis. The Japanese policies were only partially successful in recapitalizing the banks until the economy finally started to recover in 2003. From these unsuccessful attempts, we derive eight lessons. In light of these eight lessons, we assess the policies the U.S. has pursued. The U.S. has ignored three of the lessons and it is too early to evaluate the U.S. policies with respect to four of the others. So far, the U.S. has avoided Japan's problem of having impaired banks prop up zombie firms.

We explore the idea that financial distress is costly because free-rider problems and information asymmetries make it difficult for firms to renegotiate with their creditors. We present evidence that Japanese firms with financial structures in which these problems are likely to be small perform better than other firms after the onset of distress. In particular, we show that firms in industrial groups — those with close financial relationships to their banks, suppliers, and customers — invest more and sell more after the onset of distress than nongroup firms. We find similar results for nongroup firms that nevertheless have strong ties to a main bank.

We design and conduct a firm-level survey on the use of COVID-19-related government programs, in collaboration with Tokyo Shoko Research, LTD (TSR). Combining the survey results with the financial statements of the respondent firms, we investigate the factors behind the allocation of various government programs. We find that firms that had low credit scores in 2019, before the COVID-19 pandemic, were more likely to apply for and receive the subsidies and concessional loans offered by the Japanese government in 2020, controlling for the sales growth after the onset of the pandemic. Firms with low credit scores are not necessarily zombies, which are defined to be the firms that are non-viable but kept alive by assistance from creditors and/or the government. Our result suggests that the government assistance may have subsidized some poorly performing firms that were not yet zombies before the pandemic.

Large Japanese banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (which we call zombies). We examine the implications of suppressing the normal competitive process whereby the zombies would shed workers and lose market share. The congestion created by the zombies reduces the profits for healthy firms, which discourages their entry and investment. We confirm that zombie-dominated industries exhibit more depressed job creation and destruction, and lower productivity. We present firm-level regressions showing that the increase in zombies depressed the investment and employment growth of non-zombies and widened the productivity gap between zombies and non-zombies. (JEL G21, G32, L25)