There is a long running debate over whether competition in the mutual fund industry limits the ability of investment advisors to charge fees that are disproportionate to the services they provide. We posit that disproportionately high fees are prevalent in funds with multiple share classes and those with weak governance structures. Using a comprehensive sample of index mutual funds for the from 1998 to 2007, we find that internal governance mechanisms matter primarily for funds with relatively small share classes where investors often face increased search costs and/or restricted access to competitive mutual funds. Additionally, we find that funds managed by publicly held sponsors are associated with disproportionately higher fee spreads (about 28 basis points). The results are robust to the inclusion of board characteristics, share class structure, and investment objectives. Overall, our findings suggest that competition and agency considerations are important determinants in the pricing of mutual funds.

This article examines trading behavior in the options market conditioned on mispricing in the underlying stock. We investigate the price equilibrium between the observed equity asset and the options-implied synthetic share as well as the relative divergence between the two prices. We find a consistently positive relation between the level of stock mispricing and violations of the upper-boundary condition using derivatives, along with an increase in price divergence. To control for the effect of shorting limitations on mispricing, we further examine prices during the short-sale ban in 2008. The results hold and in many instances are more significant during the ban period. Given the persistent disequilibria between the synthetic and observed stock prices, we argue the results are evidence of informed trading in the derivatives market.