This paper studies the matching of opportunities with talent when costly diagnosis confers an informational advantage to the agent undertaking it. When this agent is underqualified, adverse selection prevents efficient referrals through fixed-price contracts. Spot-market contracts that rely on income sharing can match opportunities with talent but induce a team-production problem which, if severe enough, can prevent the referral of valuable opportunities. Partnership contracts, in which agents agree in advance to the allocation of opportunities and of the revenues they generate, support referrals where the market cannot, but often at the expense of distortions on those opportunities that are not referred.

We propose a general equilibrium model with multiple securities in which investors' risk preferences and expectations of dividend growth are time-varying. While time-varying risk preferences induce the standard positive relation between the dividend yield and expected returns, time-varying expected dividend growth induces a negative relation between them. These offsetting effects reduce the ability of the dividend yield to forecast returns and eliminate its ability to forecast dividend growth, as observed in the data. The model links the predictability of returns to that of dividend growth, suggesting specific changes to standard linear predictive regressions for both. The model's predictions are confirmed empirically.