This paper investigates how institutional environment like property rights protection influences the size and composition of corporate boards, and further, how board structure impacts firm performance in China. Using a World Bank survey of 2400 public and private firms across 18 Chinese cities, I find robust evidence that weaker helping hand from the government is associated with a higher number and proportion of outsiders on the board, after controlling for the effects of firm complexity, growth opportunities, CEO characteristics, ownership, and the potential endogeneity concern. Furthermore, the results show that when firms are operating in a weak property rights environment, more outsiders improve corporate performance.

We investigate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate tax avoidance. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimator to assess the effects of changes in analyst coverage caused by broker closures and mergers, we find that firms avoid tax more aggressively after a reduction in analyst coverage. We further find that this effect is mainly driven by firms with higher existing tax-planning capacity (e.g., tax-haven presence), smaller initial analyst coverage, and a smaller number of peer firms. Moreover, the effect is more pronounced in industries where reputation matters more and in firms subject to less monitoring from tax authorities.

This article studies how the three-way interaction among shareholders, creditors, and managers shapes firms’ executive compensation. Firms with a higher ownership share by “dual holders”—institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bond of the company—adopt a less risk-inducing compensation structure: less stock options and more inside debt. Exploiting financial institution mergers that increase or decrease dual ownership for portfolio companies, we identify a causal link between dual ownership and CEO compensation policies. Mutual fund proxy voting data suggest that shareholder voting is an important channel for dual holders to implement less convex contracts.

We examine the impact of financial analysts on the efficiency of firms' investment decisions. We use the accuracy and dispersion of financial analysts' earnings forecasts as proxies of analyst expertise and quality in making forecasts. We find that high quality forecast is associated with higher investment if the firm is more likely to under-invest and lower investment if the firm is more likely to over-invest, suggesting that forecast quality increases firm-level investment efficiency. We further show that such effects are stronger for the firms with higher information asymmetry and lower institutional stock ownership. The results are consistent with the notion that higher quality of analyst forecasts increases the information environment and external monitoring, which in turn increases investment efficiency.

Exploring the minimum wage policy discontinuities at county borders, we find that minimum wage hikes induce industrial firms to pollute more and reduce their abatement efforts. State ownership mitigates these negative effects, suggesting its role in addressing externality. The adverse environmental impacts are attenuated by the staggered increase in pollution discharge fees across provinces. These effects are stronger for firms with higher minimum wage sensitivity, lower market power, and greater financial constraints, and for firms that are the subsidiaries of nonlisted companies. Overall, our findings highlight the unintended environmental consequences of labor market policies.

This study uses two distinct quasi-natural experiments to examine the effect of institutional shareholders on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We first find that an exogenous increase in institutional holding caused by Russell Index reconstitutions improves portfolio firms’ CSR performance. We then find that firms have lower CSR ratings when shareholders are distracted due to exogenous shocks. Moreover, the effect of institutional ownership is stronger in CSR categories that are financially material. Furthermore, we show that institutional shareholders influence CSR through CSR-related proposals. Overall, our results suggest that institutional shareholders can generate real social impact.

Building on two sources of exogenous shocks to analyst coverage (broker closures and mergers), we explore the causal effects of analyst coverage on mitigating managerial expropriation of outside shareholders. We find that as a firm experiences an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, shareholders value internal cash holdings less, its CEO receives higher excess compensation, its management is more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions, and its managers are more likely to engage in earnings management activities. Importantly, we find that most of these effects are mainly driven by the firms with smaller initial analyst coverage and less product market competition. We further find that after exogenous brokerage exits, a CEO׳s total and excess compensation become less sensitive to firm performance in firms with low initial analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with the monitoring hypothesis, specifically that financial analysts play an important governance role in scrutinizing management behavior, and the market is pricing an increase in expected agency problems after the loss in analyst coverage.

Based on data from 32 countries over the period 1996–2010, this paper is the first to assess the relationship between financial innovation, on the one hand, and bank growth and fragility, as well as economic growth, on the other hand. We find that different measures of financial innovation, capturing both a broad concept and specific innovations, are associated with faster bank growth, but also higher bank fragility and worse bank performance during the recent crisis. These effects are stronger in countries with larger securities markets and more restrictive regulatory frameworks. In spite of these seemingly ambiguous findings, our evidence points to a positive net effect of financial innovation on economic growth: financial innovation is associated with higher growth in countries and industries with better growth opportunities.

We examine sunshine-induced mood and its impacts on investors' bidding decisions in the primary market where seasoned equities are offered. Analyzing a unique database that records seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) investors' locations, identities, and bidding information, we examine the degree to which sunshine exerts an influence on investors' bidding behaviors (and subsequently SEO discounts) from two dimensions: sunshine intensity and duration. We find that investors exposed to stronger sunshine intensity or longer sunshine duration submit a higher bid price for SEOs, thus leading to lower offer discounts. We also find that mood misattribution and risk-taking act as channels to rationalize such a sunshine effect. Our moderating analyses indicate that the documented impact strengthens in the case of greater uncertainty, less-frequent bidders, retail investors, and lower levels of investment. These sunshine effects impact failed bids, SEO participation and SEOs' long-term performance. Our study provides original evidence that investors in the primary market can be influenced by a sunshine-induced mood, which, in turn, determines the cost of equity financing.

We explore the impact of capital adequacy requirements on financial institutions’ risk-taking behavior from a novel perspective. Specifically, we show that an important feature of the risk-based capital (RBC) system—a built-in diversification benefit in aggregating risk categories—induces moral hazard. We find that insurers that face lower marginal RBC costs of fixed-income (FI) investment tend to purchase riskier FI securities. This relationship holds even when lower marginal RBC costs result from increased risk in other risk categories, which is an unintended consequence of the RBC's square root rule. Using Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy as exogenous shocks to the RBC cost, we find that insurers that suffered more in the two disasters undertook more risk in their FI investments and witnessed an increase in their overall risk. We further show that insurers with a high RBC cost sell similar risky bonds during the financial crisis, presenting a source of systemic risk. These results provide an important regulatory implication for minimum capital calculation in capital regulation regimes.