Following the global financial crisis, banks lengthened the average maturity of their assets relative to that of their liabilities, principally by increasing their investments in mortgage-related assets. Whether such maturity transformation exposes banks to interest rate risk depends, in part, on the effectiveness of bank deposits as a hedge against interest rate shocks. In this paper we provide evidence that interest pass-through rates on deposits vary significantly with interest rates, which reduces the effectiveness of deposits as a hedge when interest rates increase. The dynamic nature of the deposit betas explains, in part, why the duration of bank equity varies with interest rates and why interest rate risk models need to account for how pass-through rates vary with interest rates.

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have emerged as a new organizational structure that leverages smart contracts and blockchain technology. Academics and practitioners have paid significant attention to DAOs, yet DAO decision-making processes and the broader implications remain under-studied. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. First, we compare the proposal- and voting-based governance mechanisms of DAOs with those of traditional corporate governance. Second, we introduce various novel voting models adopted by DAOs. Third, we discuss DAOs' drawbacks and highlight a unique agency problem arising from large token holders, termed “whales,” within these organizations. The concentrated ownership such whales, whose interests may diverge from those of smaller token holders (i.e., users), obtain can result in governance vulnerabilities. After discussing recent instances of investor activism and contentious votes involving DAOs, we conclude by surveying the literature on the optimal DAO design.

We document numerous occurrences of pump-and-dump schemes (P&Ds) targeting cryptocurrencies, which tend to trigger short-term episodes that feature dramatic increases in prices, volume, and volatility, followed by quick reversals. The evidence we document, including price run-ups before P&Ds start, suggests wealth transfers from outsiders to insiders. Our findings based on wallet-level data are consistent with the reasoning that gambling preferences, overconfidence, and naïve reinforcement learning help explain P&D participation. Finally, exploiting two natural experiments in which exchanges altered P&D policies, we find evidence consistent with the idea that P&Ds contribute to reduced cryptocurrency liquidity and lower prices.