A global field experiment with Seeking Alpha shows that textual complexity affects investor attention to news and market outcomes. Investors were randomly assigned different titles for the same news article. Holding the article fixed, a one-standard-deviation increase in complexity leads to 6.1% fewer views. Complexity is more off-putting for less-sophisticated investors, when attention is more limited, and when the news is likely less important. Exploiting an arbitrary rule for breaking ties between tested titles, I find that title complexity affects markets—lowering announcement turnover and volatility.

We examine the costs of trading restrictions by exploiting an SEC rule change eliminating an approximately 80-day restriction period in private placements for small issuers. Using a difference-in-differences specification, we find that the restriction is binding, as dollar volume increases 19 percentage points vis-à-vis proceeds, and costly, as offering discounts fall by 8 percentage points. Discounts fall more for issuers with higher information asymmetry or longer restriction periods. We account for endogenous responses to the rule change. Overall, our findings suggest that trading restrictions are costly and have large effects on firms’ cost of capital.

Permissive laws deputize financial professionals to screen for misbehavior without providing explicit incentives. These are very common in financial markets. To evaluate their effectiveness, we exploit the staggered adoption of the 2016 Model Act provisions intended to curb elder abuse. We find a drop in reports of abuse by financial professionals to the Department of Treasury and, separately, in financial crimes against the elderly as monitored by the FBI . The effect is stronger where the elderly are more isolated. Our results highlight the role financial professionals play in combating social problems and the impact of permissive policies.

The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over “ midsize” investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions.

Large firms typically increase their cash holdings as they grow to buffer against greater cash flow volatility. However, data on 11.2 million small firms show the opposite: cash levels decline as firms expand. We explain this phenomenon through a liquidity management model. Small firms with limited cash flows rely on cash reserves for investment due to costly external financing. As they grow, they do not fully replenish their cash reserves because investment incentives decrease, and increased cash flows support more of their anticipated investments. This mechanism generates a negative correlation between cash holdings and firm size among small firms.