This study provides large sample evidence on the effects of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) on takeover probability and premia in modern takeover contests. Despite the fact that hostile bids are uncommon during the 1990s–2000s, some ATPs have strong but opposing effects on takeover outcomes. Consistent with recent theory, the staggered board-poison pill combination is the strongest antitakeover mechanism. Takeover compensation arrangements reduce managerial resistance to takeovers, and many commonly used ATPs are irrelevant in modern takeover battles. Furthermore, compensation plans are associated with higher takeover premia. Although individual ATPs have significant effects on takeover outcomes, the G-Index, which does not account for the diverse effects of ATPs, is not significant in predicting the firm's takeover probability or the size of takeover premia.

We use data from the Surveys of Small Business Finances to classify small privately held firms into four groups based upon their need for credit. Our results reveal strong and significant differences among each of these four groups of firms. Firms that report no need for credit are significantly less levered, more liquid, older, and of higher credit quality than are firms that report a need for credit, and their owners are older, are more likely to be white, are more creditworthy, and have fewer bank and nonbank relationships. Firms reporting that they were discouraged from applying for credit significantly outnumber and are significantly different from firms that applied for and were denied credit on a number of dimensions such as size, profitability, owner age, and the number of sources of financial services. Our counterfactual analysis indicates that about one in three discouraged borrowers would have received credit had they applied for credit. Denied borrowers differ from approved borrowers across numerous characteristics, as previously documented in the literature.

We analyze the relation between different forms of debt financing at the firm's start-up and subsequent firm outcomes. We distinguish between business debt, obtained in the name of the firm, and personal debt, obtained in the name of the firm's owner and used to finance the start-up firm. Start-up firms with better performance prospects are more likely to use debt and, in particular, business debt. Compared to all-equity firms, firms using debt at the initial year of operations are significantly more likely to survive and achieve higher levels of revenue three years after the firm's start-up. However, results hold for business debt only. Debt obtained in the name of the firm is associated with longer survival time and higher revenues, while debt obtained in the name of the firm's owner has no effect on survival time and is associated with lower revenues.

Using data on security holdings for 10,771 institutional investors from 72 countries, we test whether concentrated investment strategies result in excess risk-adjusted returns. We examine several measures of portfolio concentration with respect to countries and industries and find that portfolio concentration is directly related to risk-adjusted returns for institutional investors worldwide. Results suggest, in contrast to traditional asset pricing theory and in support of information advantage theory, that concentrated investment strategies in international markets can be optimal.