Executive compensation is increasingly being linked to ESG outcomes. This paper examines whether ESG targets are consistent with shareholder welfare. Using granular information on compensation contracts of Swedish CEOs, we show that ESG and financial targets are competing. ESG-linked compensation is 5 percentage points more common in well-governed firms and 6.3 percentage points more likely for CEOs with broader skill sets (generalist CEOs). ESG scores of well-governed firms improve when generalist CEOs have ESG-linked pay, but there is no effect on profitability. These results suggest that boards set ESG contracts because shareholders derive utility from ESG in addition to wealth, and ESG may not be produced without these incentives.

We examine whether there is birthplace bias in addition to local bias in the portfolio choice of individual investors. We find that, on average, individual investors who live in their birthplace invest almost three times more of their portfolio capital in local firms than other locals. A bias toward birthplace firms persists for a long time after moving elsewhere and increases significantly for “homecomers.” Our detailed analysis suggests that individual investors’ proximity bias is largely an urban phenomenon, which is explained neither by the information hypothesis nor by the familiarity hypothesis. We find that more sophisticated investors, in terms of portfolio diversification, earn, on average, abnormal portfolio returns, but they do this regardless of their portfolio distortion. Thus, attention ought to be directed toward whether individual investors are financially sophisticated rather than whether they are proximity biased.