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Effects of Technical Department’s Advice, Quality Assessment Standards, and Client Justifications on Auditors’ Propensity to Accept Client-Preferred Accounting Methods
ABSTRACT: We conduct an experiment to investigate whether the effects of an SAS No. 90-like quality assessment standard (QAS) on auditors’ decision to accept a client-preferred accounting method is jointly moderated by the nature of advice from an audit firm’s technical department and the strength of the client’s justification. Results indicate that, in the absence of advice, the presence of QAS does not affect auditors’ decision, regardless of client justification strength. However, in the presence of advice from the technical department, the presence of QAS significantly reduces auditors’ propensity to accept the client-preferred method, but only when the advice explicitly recommends the use of the most appropriate method and the client’s justification is strong. These findings demonstrate the complementary roles that professional standards and audit firms’ technical departments play in enhancing the quality of auditors’ decisions, and indicate that the nature of advice matters.
Effects of Authoritative Guidance Availability and Audit Committee Effectiveness on Auditors' Judgments in an Auditor-Client Negotiation Context
In this paper, we present the results of an experiment that investigates the effects of two contextual features—the availability of authoritative guidance and the effectiveness of the client's audit committee—on auditors' perceived outcome of auditor-client negotiations concerning an audit adjustment that affects the client's ability to meet analysts' forecasts. Results show that auditors' perceived negotiation outcome is jointly influenced by authoritative guidance availability and audit committee effectiveness. Specifically, authoritative guidance availability has a greater effect on auditors' perceived negotiation outcome in the absence of an effective audit committee than in its presence. We also find that concessionary moves by the client increase auditors' propensity to concede to the client's preferred position.