Cash tender, cash merger, and stock merger takeover premiums for 1974–1985 are approximately bouble those for 1963–1973. Cash tender repurchase premiums also rose in 1974. Thse upward shifts remain after we control for the business cycle and a possible time trend in premiums. The shift in both takeover and repurchase premiums in 1973–1974 is consistent with some event not unique to the takeover market affecting the capital markets in 1973–1974. We also investigate the possible effect on takeover premiums of the 1986 Williams Act and conclude that it does not explain the premium increase.

This study testa whether there is a relationship between the lobbying activities of firms on a proposed accounting standard (FAS No. 191 and the trading activities of corporate insiders. We find that, on average, insiders of full cost firms that lobbied were net sellers and successful efforts lobbiers were net buyers, while non-lobbiers took opposite positions. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that lobbying activity is correlated with management's expected wealth. The results are also consistent with comment letters to the FASB having information value, since insider, trade on their personal account in the same direction their firms lobby. Alternatively, the results can be interpreted as support for the conclusion of Larcker, Reder and Simon [1983] that FAS No. 19 was perceived to have economic consequences.

[This study tests whether there is a relationship between the lobbying activities of firms on a proposed accounting standard (FAS No. 19) and the trading activities of corporate insiders. We find that, on average, insiders of full cost firms that lobbied were net sellers and successful efforts lobbiers were net buyers, while non-lobbiers took opposite positions. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that lobbying activity is correlated with management's expected wealth. The results are also consistent with comment letters to the FASB having information value, since insiders trade on their personal account in the same direction their firms lobby. Alternatively, the results can be interpreted as support for the conclusion of Larcker, Reder and Simon [1983] that FAS No. 19 was perceived to have economic consequences.]

This study examines the predictive value of Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) information. More specifically, this study tests the association between properties of analysts' earnings forecasts and MD&A quality, where MD&A quality is measured by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). We find that high MD&A ratings are associated with less error and less dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts after controlling for many other expected influences on analysts' forecasts. We also find that estimated regression coefficients are consistent with MD&A information having a substantial effect on earnings forecasts. Finally, we find our results are driven by forward‐looking disclosures about capital expenditures and operations, and also by historical disclosures about capital expenditures. These findings are consistent with the suggestion by many constituencies (including the SEC) that the type of information found in high quality MD&A is particularly relevant for predicting earnings.

John A. Carlson, Terrence B. O'Keefe; Buffer Stocks and Reaction Coefficients: An Experiment with Decision Making under Risk1, The Review of Economic Studi

Terrence B. O'Keefe, Dan A. Simunic, Michael T. Stein, The Production of Audit Services: Evidence from a Major Public Accounting Firm, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 241-261