We examine whether internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management in U.S. corporations. Internal governance refers to the process through which key subordinate executives provide checks and balances in the organization and affect corporate decisions. Using the number of years to retirement to capture key subordinate executives' horizon incentives and using their compensation relative to CEO compensation to capture their influence within the firm, we find that the extent of real earnings management decreases with key subordinate executives' horizon and influence. The results are robust to alternative measures of internal governance and to various approaches used to address potential endogeneity, including a difference-in-differences approach. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the effect of internal governance is stronger for firms with more complex operations where key subordinate executives' contribution is higher, is enhanced when CEOs are less powerful, is weaker when the capital markets benefit of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks is higher, and is stronger in the post-SOX period. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how internal governance affects the extent of real earnings management and by shedding light on how the members of the management team work together in shaping financial reporting quality.

We investigate the association between financial constraints and cash savings generated through tax planning. We predict that an increase in financial constraints leads firms to increase internally generated funds via tax planning. We measure financial constraints based on changes in firm-specific and macroeconomic measures. We find that firms facing increases in financial constraints exhibit increases in cash tax planning. Our results indicate that among profitable firms, firm-years with the largest increases in firm-specific constraints are associated with declines in firms' cash effective tax rates ranging from 3.00 to 5.14 percent, which equate to between 2.87 and 4.82 percent of operating cash flows. We also find that (1) the impact of financial constraints on tax planning is greatest among firms with low cash reserves, and (2) constrained firms achieve a substantial portion of their current tax savings via deferral-based tax planning strategies, despite the lack of a financial statement benefit. JEL Classifications: E69; H25; H60. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.

Although the differential persistence of accruals and operating cash flows is a firm-specific phenomenon, research seeking to exploit the differential persistence of these earnings components typically employs cross-sectional forecasting models. We find that a model based on firm-specific estimates of the differential persistence of accruals and operating cash flows is incrementally useful for out-of-sample forecasting relative to state-of-the-art cross-sectional models. In doing so, we show that firm-specific estimates of differential persistence are particularly useful when forecasting earnings for more stable firms (e.g., more profitable, lower growth, and less levered firms). We also demonstrate that a trading strategy exploiting investors' fixation on earnings and based on firm-specific estimates of differential persistence earns statistically and economically significant excess returns that are incremental to those generated by trading strategies based on the size of accruals. These results suggest that firm-specific estimates of differential persistence are incrementally informative for forecasting and valuation.

Based on Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia's (2007) derivation of the cost of equity capital in terms of expected cash flows, we generate a testable hypothesis that relates tax avoidance to a firm's cost of equity capital. Using three broad measures of tax avoidance—book-tax differences, permanent book-tax differences, and long-run cash effective tax rates—to test our hypothesis, we find that the cost of equity is lower for tax-avoiding firms. This effect is stronger for firms with better outside monitoring, firms that likely realize higher marginal benefits from tax savings, and firms with higher information quality. Overall, our results suggest that equity investors generally require a lower expected rate of return due to the positive cash flow effects of corporate tax avoidance.