Companies are adopting executive compensation recoupment (“clawback”) policies to discourage aggressive financial reporting choices. Recent research suggests clawback policies encourage other means of meeting earnings expectations. We suggest that reducing income tax expense is a means of meeting earnings expectations. We find that effective tax rates are lower after clawback adoption due to increased investments in tax planning. We identify three tax planning activities that clawback companies invest in to lower effective tax rates: purchases of auditor-provided tax services, increased connections to other low-tax companies, and use of tax havens. We provide evidence that effective tax rate decreases do not result from use of opportunistic income tax accruals, and that decreases are stronger among companies that adopt robust clawback policies. Additional tests indicate lower tax outcome volatility and longer, more readable tax footnotes following clawback adoption. Our results suggest a positive spillover effect of clawback adoption on corporate tax policy.

This study uses insights from tax practitioners and tax authorities to define and develop an estimate of ex ante tax risk that is independent of common tax outcomes studied in prior literature. Validation tests confirm that our tax risk measure (i) represents the predictable and unpredictable uncertainty inherent in the three sources of tax risk (i.e., economic risk, tax law uncertainty, and inaccurate information processing) and (ii) is a construct different from tax avoidance, tax uncertainty, and general business risk. Using our tax risk measure, we address two research questions of interest to academics and practitioners. First, we examine the association between tax risk and long‐run tax avoidance and find a negative association between tax risk and future long‐run cash effective tax rates (ETRs). Second, we consider the extent to which unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) reflect tax risk, tax avoidance, or financial reporting incentives and demonstrate that our tax risk measure explains a substantial portion of UTBs, incremental and relative to measures of information risk, conditional conservatism, unconditional conservatism, and tax avoidance. Our study offers a measure of tax risk that, consistent with the Scholes‐Wolfson paradigm, reflects the tax risk inherent in all business activities, not just tax avoidance activities; has unique industry effects; and contributes to our understanding of the factors that affect tax planning decisions and result in variation in firms' ETRs. Our findings will help managers and tax practitioners focus on industry‐specific tax risk components, assess risk during tax planning initiatives, exercise caution when engaging in additional risk if ETRs are low, and adapt tax risk strategies to fit specific company needs. We enhance future tax research by improving the definition and measurement of tax risk.