Recent empirical studies have shown that innovative firms heavily rely on debt financing. Debt overhang implies that debt hampers innovation by incumbents. A second effect of debt is that it stimulates innovation by entrants. Using a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous R&D and financing choices, we demonstrate that this second effect always dominates, so that debt fosters innovation and growth at the aggregate level. Our analysis suggests that the relation between debt and investment is more complex than previously acknowledged and highlights potential limitations of empirical work that solely focuses on incumbents when measuring the effects of debt on investment.

Capital ages and must eventually be replaced. We propose a theory of financing in which firms borrow to finance investment and deleverage as capital ages to have enough financial slack to finance replacement investments. To achieve these dynamics, firms issue debt with a maturity that matches the useful life of assets and a repayment schedule that reflects the need to free up debt capacity as capital ages. In the model, leverage and debt maturity are negatively related to capital age while debt maturity and the length of debt cycles are positively related to asset life. We provide empirical evidence that strongly supports these predictions.

We develop a theory of stakeholder governance examining how green stakeholders influence organizations. Conflicts of interest arise from heterogeneous green preferences and intensify as they diverge. Changes in green preferences can generate unexpected outcomes by shifting control rights: greener stakeholders may reduce organizational sustainability, while browner ones might enhance it. We show that a top-down approach consistently improves organizational sustainability, while a bottom-up approach can harm it. We also uncover an asymmetry in compensation and delegation decisions between green and brown principals, driven by the public good nature of social payoffs. These findings have implications for manager–employee, investor–entrepreneur, and board–CEO relationships.

We propose a model of due diligence and analyze its effect on prices, payoffs, and deal completion. In our model, if the seller accepts an offer, the winning bidder (or “acquirer”) can gather information and chooses when to complete the transaction. In equilibrium, the acquirer engages in “too much” due diligence. Our quantitative results suggest that the magnitude of the distortion is economically significant. Nevertheless, allowing for due diligence can improve both total surplus and the seller's payoff compared to a setting without due diligence. We use our framework to explore the timing of due diligence, bidder heterogeneity, and breakup fees.