Venture capital financing is widely believed to be influential for new innovative companies. We provide empirical evidence that venture capital financing is related to product market strategies and outcomes of start-ups. Using a unique hand-collected database of Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups we find that innovator firms are more likely to obtain venture capital than imitator firms. Venture capital is also associated with a significant reduction in the time to bring a product to market, especially for innovators. Our results suggest significant interrelations between investor types and product market dimensions, and a role of venture capital for innovative companies.

Journal Article The Interaction between Product Market and Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital Get access Thomas Hellmann, Thomas Hellmann Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Manju Puri Manju Puri Stanford University Address correspondence to Manju Puri, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, or e-mail: [email protected]. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 13, Issue 4, October 2000, Pages 959–984, https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/13.4.959 Published: 15 June 2015

In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also have a perverse effect of harming banks' franchise values, thus encouraging gambling. Pareto-efficient outcomes can be achieved by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, since they facilitate prudent investment by increasing franchise values. Even if deposit-rate ceilings are not binding on the equilibrium path, they may be useful in deterring gambling off the equilibrium path. (JEL G2, E4, L5)