[In this article, we use a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data to analyze the role of institutional investors in initial public offerings (IPOs). The theoretical literature on IPOs has long argued that institutional investors possess private information about IPOs and that underpricing is a mechanism for compensating them to reveal this private information. We study whether institutions indeed have private information about IPOs, retain their information advantage in post-IPO trading, and are able to realize significant profits from their participation in IPOs. We also study institutional IPO allocations and allocation sales to analyze whether institutions play an important role in supporting IPOs in the aftermarket and are rewarded by underwriters for playing such a role. We find that institutions sell 70.2% of their IPO allocations in the first year, fully realize the "money left on the table," and do not dissipate these profits in post-IPO trading. Further, institutions hold allocations in IPOs with weaker post-issue demand for a longer period, and they are rewarded for this by underwriters with more IPO allocations. Finally, institutional trading has predictive power for long-run IPO performance, especially in IPOs in which they received allocations; however, this predictive power decays over time. Overall, our results suggest that institutional investors possess significant private information about IPOs, play an important supportive role in the IPO aftermarket, and receive considerable compensation for their participation in IPOs.]

[At what point in a firm's life should it go public? How do a firm's ex ante product market characteristics relate to its going-public decision? Further, what are the implications of a firm going public on its post-IPO operating and product market performance? In this article, we answer the above questions by conducting the first large sample study of the going-public decisions of U.S. firms in the literature. We use the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau, which covers the entire universe of private and public U.S. manufacturing firms. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, a private firm's product market characteristics (total factor productivity [TFP], size, sales growth, market share, industry competitiveness, capital intensity, and cash flow riskiness) significantly affect its likelihood of going public after controlling for its access to private financing (venture capital or bank loans). Second, private firms facing less information asymmetry and those with projects that are cheaper for outsiders to evaluate are more likely to go public. Third, as more firms in an industry go public, the concentration of that industry increases in subsequent years. The above results are robust to controlling for the interactions between various product market and firm-specific variables. Fourth, IPOs of firms occur at the peak of their productivity cycle: the dynamics of TFP and sales growth exhibit an inverted U-shaped pattern, both in our univariate analysis and in our multivariate analysis using firms that remained private throughout as a benchmark. Finally, sales, capital expenditures, and other performance variables exhibit a consistently increasing pattern over the years before and after the IPO. The last two findings are consistent with the view that the widely documented post-IPO operating underperformance of firms is due to the real investment effects of going public rather than being due to earnings management immediately prior to the IPO.]

In this article, we use a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data to analyze the role of institutional investors in initial public offerings (IPOs). The theoretical literature on IPOs has long argued that institutional investors possess private information about IPOs and that underpricing is a mechanism for compensating them to reveal this private information. We study whether institutions indeed have private information about IPOs, retain their information advantage in post-IPO trading, and are able to realize significant profits from their participation in IPOs. We also study institutional IPO allocations and allocation sales to analyze whether institutions play an important role in supporting IPOs in the aftermarket and are rewarded by underwriters for playing such a role. We find that institutions sell 70.2% of their IPO allocations in the first year, fully realize the “money left on the table,” and do not dissipate these profits in post-IPO trading. Further, institutions hold allocations in IPOs with weaker post-issue demand for a longer period, and they are rewarded for this by underwriters with more IPO allocations. Finally, institutional trading has predictive power for long-run IPO performance, especially in IPOs in which they received allocations; however, this predictive power decays over time. Overall, our results suggest that institutional investors possess significant private information about IPOs, play an important supportive role in the IPO aftermarket, and receive considerable compensation for their participation in IPOs.

At what point in a firm's life should it go public? How do a firm's ex ante product market characteristics relate to its going-public decision? Further, what are the implications of a firm going public on its post-IPO operating and product market performance? In this article, we answer the above questions by conducting the first large sample study of the going-public decisions of U.S. firms in the literature. We use the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau, which covers the entire universe of private and public U.S. manufacturing firms. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, a private firm's product market characteristics (total factor productivity [TFP], size, sales growth, market share, industry competitiveness, capital intensity, and cash flow riskiness) significantly affect its likelihood of going public after controlling for its access to private financing (venture capital or bank loans). Second, private firms facing less information asymmetry and those with projects that are cheaper for outsiders to evaluate are more likely to go public. Third, as more firms in an industry go public, the concentration of that industry increases in subsequent years. The above results are robust to controlling for the interactions between various product market and firm-specific variables. Fourth, IPOs of firms occur at the peak of their productivity cycle: the dynamics of TFP and sales growth exhibit an inverted U-shaped pattern, both in our univariate analysis and in our multivariate analysis using firms that remained private throughout as a benchmark. Finally, sales, capital expenditures, and other performance variables exhibit a consistently increasing pattern over the years before and after the IPO. The last two findings are consistent with the view that the widely documented post-IPO operating underperformance of firms is due to the real investment effects of going public rather than being due to earnings management immediately prior to the IPO.

In this paper, we develop new insights about the dynamics of corporate dividend policy by performing the natural experiment of comparing corporate dividend policies in Hong Kong and the U.S., two economies where the tax regime and equity ownership structure are significantly different. Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, a test of the Lintner model reveals that the extent of dividend smoothing by firms in Hong Kong is significantly less than those in the U.S. Second, the signaling effects of dividend changes on stock returns are stronger in the U.S. compared to those in Hong Kong. Third, our logit analysis of the determinants of dividend changes indicates that, while the lagged dividend yield significantly affects dividend changes in both countries in the same fashion, prior year stock returns have opposite effects on dividend changes in the two countries. Finally, the extent of dividend smoothing is not systematically related to blockholder equity ownership in either country. Overall, our results suggest that, compared to U.S. firms, Hong Kong firms pursue a more flexible dividend policy commensurate with earnings, and that the differences between the dividend policies of firms in the two countries are consistent with the signaling implications of the differences in the tax regime across the two countries.

We analyze the relation between antitakeover provisions (ATPs) and the performance of spin-off firms. We find that firms protected by more ATPs before spin-offs have higher abnormal announcement returns and greater improvements in post-spin-off operating performance than firms with fewer ATPs. Further, firms that reduce the number of ATPs after spin-offs have greater improvements in operating performance than firms that do not reduce the number of ATPs. Finally, CEOs of pre-spin-off firms tend to retain more ATPs in parent firms and assign fewer ATPs to the spun-off units if they remain as the CEOs of the parents but not the spun-off units. Overall, our results indicate a positive relation between ATPs and the value gains to spin-offs.