I develop a benchmark for evaluating whether fair values disclosed by banks differ from investors' estimates of the market value of financial assets and liabilities. Using this benchmark, I conclude that the hypothesis that disclosed fair values closely approximate investors' estimates should be rejected. I present evidence suggesting that the procedure used in establishing fair values results in an understatement of the value of financial assets an an overstatement of liabilities. I also conclude that the reaction of bank stocks to the adoption of SFAS 105, 107, and 115 is more consistent with regulatory concerns and not with potential adverse effects of those statements for contracting.

The relationships among mandated accounting changes, bond covenants and security prices has been the focus of several studies. These studies have provided mixed evidence on the existence of a bond covenant effect on security prices. This paper suggests that inconclusive prior results are a consequence of inappropriately measuring the default risk of debt. Using an option pricing framework, it is shown that the debt to equity alone is not an adequate measure of default risk. In particular, both the debt to equity ratio and the total risk of the firm are necessary to adequately model the bond covenant effects of an accounting change. These theoretical propositions are supported by the empirical analysis of the security market reaction to changes in oil and gas accounting.

AT&T's 7.5 billion acquisition of NCR decreased the wealth of AT&T shareholders by between 3.9 billion and 6.5 billion and resulted in negative synergies of 1.3 to 3.0 billion. We find that AT&T paid a documented 50 million and possibly as much as $500 million to satisfy pooling accounting, thus boosting EPS by roughly 17% but leaving cash flows unchanged. We conclude that AT&T's decision to acquire NCR in what the market perceived as a value-destroying transaction was related at least in part to the 1984 consent decree with the Department of Justice that led to the break-up of AT&T.

This paper argues that audit firms achieve competitive advantages through specialization, and that clients purchase audit services from the least cost supplier. Client-auditor realignments thus represent efficient responses to changes in client operations and activities over time. Results obtained from analyzing the financial characteristics and share price performance of corporations that changed auditors between 1973 and 1982 support the view that realignments can generally be attributed to cross-temporal changes in client characteristics and differences in audit firm cost structures.

Auditing, Auditor litigation, Audit failures, Lawsuits

Building on the work of Bernard and Thomas 1990, we develop a model to infer the degree to which the information in an earnings announcement is incorporated into investors' expectations for the subsequent earnings announcement at any point in time between the two announcements. We are unable to reject the null hypothesis that investors' earnings expectations are based on a seasonal random walk and reflect none of the implications of the immediately prior earnings announcement up to 15 trading days after that announcement. By mid‐quarter, expectations are significantly more sophisticated than a seasonal random walk. Two trading days before the next earnings announcement, as much as one half of the information in the prior earnings announcement is reflected in earnings expectations. We also find that the dissemination of information, albeit predictable information, speeds the incorporation of prior earnings information into earnings expectations. Our results suggest that as information about future earnings that could have been discerned from the earlier announcements (because past earnings surprises predict future ones) is disseminated in a more transparent form, investors revise their earnings expectations to reflect this information. Thus, the investors' expectations appear to incorporate more and more of the serial correlation in earnings surprises as the quarter progresses, even though they do not consider per se the serial correlation in earnings surprises in forming their expectations.

This paper demonstrates that the evidence supporting the hypothesis that post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) is caused by investors’ failure to incorporate the implications of current earnings for future earnings is (also) consistent with researchers’ over-differencing an already stationary time-series. Specifically, we show the evidence is driven by a subset of firms where over-differencing of quarterly earnings in estimating earnings surprises is most likely to have occurred. Given the persistence of the PEAD over time, our alternative explanation suggests that the prior research investigating the causes for the PEAD overestimates investors’ naivete.

With grouping, a sample is sorted by an observable variable and the mean values of the dependent variable in the extreme-ranked groups are compared. We show that test power is maximized when the two extreme groups each contain 27% of the sample, a much larger percentage than that typically used in the literature. This result is not sensitive to the distribution of the dependent variable. We also show that regression is unambiguously more powerful than grouping, even when the independent variable is measured with error.

This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year.