Under the Articles of Confederation, the central government of the United States had limited power to tax. Therefore, large debts accumulated during the US War for Independence traded at deep discounts. That situation framed a US fiscal crisis in the 1780s. A political revolution—for that was what scuttling the Articles of Confederation in favor of the Constitution of the United States of America was—solved the fiscal crisis by transferring authority to levy tariffs from the states to the federal government. The Constitution and acts of the First Congress of the United States in August 1790 gave Congress authority to raise enough revenues to service a big government debt. In 1790, the Congress carried out a comprehensive bailout of state governments’ debts, part of a grand bargain that made creditors of the states become advocates of ample federal taxes. That bailout created expectations about future federal bailouts that a costly episode in the early 1840s proved to be unwarranted.

We compare market prices of risk in economies with identical patterns of endowments, priors, and information flows, but two different market structures, one with complete markets, another in which consumers can trade only a single risk-free bond. We study how opportunities to speculate, uncommon priors, and learning affect market prices of risk. Two types of consumers have diverse beliefs about the law of motion for a random exogenous endowment. One type knows the true law of motion while the other type learns about it via Bayes' theorem. Less-well-informed consumers are pessimistic, initially overestimating the probability of a catastrophic state. Learning dynamics and the wealth dynamics that they drive contribute to differences in evolutions of market prices of risk across market structures.