We examine how firms' reliance on Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs), either by registering or setting up subsidiaries in OFCs, affects their financial performance. Using multilevel mixed (fixed and random) effects regressions, we provide evidence that is consistent with the agency costs of tax avoidance. Information asymmetry and lax legal environments in OFCs offset tax benefits, especially for firms directly registered in OFCs. Firms directly registered in OFCs are valued 14% lower than onshore firms, while firms with subsidiaries in OFCs enjoy an 11% higher valuation than onshore firms. However, it appears that investors do not fully appreciate the extent of the agency costs due to increased information asymmetry of firms that set up subsidiaries in OFCs. We argue that the assessment of firm value must encompass the registration status of its subsidiaries rather than the parent company's origin.

We examine the effects of a multinational firm's subsidiary operations in offshore financial centers (OFCs) on bank loan contracting terms. Using a propensity score matched cross-country sample of firms with and without OFC subsidiaries, we find that firms with OFC subsidiaries receive less favorable loan terms than firms without OFC subsidiaries. The results from a difference-in-differences analysis and an analysis of a firm's mutation from a non-OFC firm to an OFC firm support the causal effect of offshore operations on the unfavorable loan terms. Furthermore, focusing on firms with OFC subsidiaries, we find that the intensity of offshore operations affects loan terms unfavorably. We also find that the unfavorable effect is more pronounced for more opaque firms and for firms that are headquartered in countries or jurisdictions with weaker legal enforcement. Our findings indicate that banks view offshore operations of borrowers as a credit risk-increasing factor.