This paper presents new evidence on performance persistence for U.S. private equity (buyout and venture capital) funds. We use high quality cash-flow data from Burgiss's large sample of institutional investors (as of December 2020) which allows us to examine how persistence has changed over more than three decades of fundraising. Venture capital (VC) performance remains remarkably persistent across funds raised by the same general partner (GP). In contrast, buyout funds' performance persistence becomes noticeably weaker over time. The patterns are different when we restrict the analysis to information that would have been available to investors – interim performance on the previous fund at the time a new fund is raised – rather than using final, or latest, performance. We find little evidence of persistence for buyouts, especially post-2000. We continue to find persistence for VC funds though it declines post-2000. The differences are driven by interim performance reported at the time of fundraising being only moderately correlated to final performance and GPs avoiding fundraising when interim performance is poor. Finally, we look at GPs who introduce new fund styles and find that performance is noticeably lower for buyouts (but not VC). Exploring the reasons for these divergent trends in persistence between buyout and VC is a promising area for future research.

While previous research has characterized the key features of contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, little is known about the contracts' evolution over time and across funding rounds. We overcome significant data challenges to compile a novel panel dataset of U.S. early-stage ventures that includes the main financial and control rights offered to investors at each (equity) funding round. We find that there is a ‘default contract’ with a distinct combination of rights that the majority of companies gravitate to. This default contract is typically implemented in the initial Series A funding round and rarely deviated from in later rounds. Whenever deviations do occur, terms are usually revised in favour of investors, and not entrepreneurs. Due to this stickiness of the default contract, for successful startups we argue that post-money valuations in later rounds can be a reasonable proxy for the economic value of the firm.